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Abstract 
 
This master thesis is a valuation of SAS AB seen through the angle of the Norwegian 
government’s ownership. It is based on publicly available information up until March 2009. 
After an introduction of the airline industry and the SAS Group, we present relevant theory 
used to value the company. Then we analyze the historical economic performance of SAS and 
the company’s strategic position. 
 
Knowledge acquired from the historical and strategic analysis is then used to create financial 
forecasts. Based on this and the estimated cost of capital the net present value of the future 
free cash flows is estimated. After adjusting for SAS’ net debt and the number of shares it 
gives us an estimated share value of SEK 5.67. The validity of this result is evaluated through 
a multiple and sensitivity analysis. The conclusion is that the government proved good 
ownership responsibility in participating in the 2009 rights issue. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background and problem statement 
 
The process of choosing a topic for our master thesis was neither obvious nor easy. Different 
types of problems and companies were considered during the fall semester, but it was one 
company that constantly came to our attention through extensively media coverage. This was 
Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), the Scandinavian flag carrier airline. 
 
Companies today operate in a fast changing environment. Some companies are more exposed 
than others and SAS AB is definitely one of those. Fast changing environments make it more 
challenging to operate profitable. Press publicity from November 2008 states that SAS AB is 
struggling because of unoccupied seats as a result of decreased demand and intense 
competition. Other external factors also make SAS AB an interesting business case. One 
example is the record high oil prices which created severe headache for SAS AB in the 
summer of 2008. The governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden are combined the 
majority owner of SAS AB. In other words it is owned by the people and it is in our own 
interest how the ownership is governed.  
 
Because of unprofitability and changed strategic focus, SAS AB has sold most of their shares 
in airlines outside the Nordic region. Intensive competition and unfavourable external factors 
have made several airlines go bankrupt in 2008 and we are witnessing a consolidation in the 
European airline industry. This resulted in speculations of a potential sale of SAS AB. Hottest 
were the rumours about Lufthansa being a potential buyer of SAS AB and several other 
companies were also mentioned. This is however unlikely to happen in near future as the 
company now is trying to save themselves from bankruptcy. Instead of a sale, SAS AB is 
raising 6 billion Swedish Kroner in new equity to meet the short term financial challenges. 
This is coupled with a new strategy plan which aims to make the company profitable in the 
future. We want to study this solution closer from an economical and strategic point of view. 
 
Choosing a company valuation as basis for our master thesis gives us a unique possibility to 
use knowledge from several, if not all, courses we have participated during five years of 
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economic and administrative education. The focus will though remain on finance which is as 
mentioned our major. Our problem statement is as follows: 
 
“Was it a good decision of the Norwegian government to take part of SAS AB’s 2009 rights 
issue?” 
 
We have chosen to look at SAS on group level. Originally SAS was a cooperation of the flag 
carriers in the Scandinavian countries. But since 2001 the originally domestic companies have 
been totally integrated in one public listed company.        
 
1.2 Purpose  
 
This master thesis is a part of our master degree in finance at the Norwegian School of 
Economics and Business Administration. The primary objective of this study is to analyze the 
Norwegian government’s choice of participating in the 2009 SAS AB equity issue from an 
economical standpoint. Fundamental values in SAS will be studied through strategic and 
financial statement analysis.  
 
With this thesis we wish to prove that we have gained the ability to use acquired theory and 
knowledge on a business case of current interest. We also hope that our results can contribute 
to a better understand of the value drivers in SAS AB and perhaps be of helpful insight when 
making future ownership decisions regarding the company.  
 
1.3 Paper structure  
 
This paper starts with an introduction and motivation for our choice of problem in chapter 
one. Then we give an overview of the airline industry and provide background information of 
SAS AB in chapter two. In chapter tree we present our choice of valuation technique and 
discuss some important theoretical issues related to it. Then we follow up in chapter four with 
the strategic framework for our analysis. 
  
In chapter five we present the historical performance of SAS AB and compare its previous 
performance to similar companies. Then in chapter six we give our strategic analysis of SAS 
AB. Based on chapter five and six we use the information provided to estimate future 
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operational income in chapter seven. These estimations are together with the calculation of 
free cash flows and the cost of capital used to valuate SAS AB in chapter eight.  
 
In chapter nine we look into the validity of our results. We try a different valuation technique 
and do a sensitivity analysis to see how the estimated value of SAS AB changes with the 
crucial inputs in our valuation model. In this chapter we also look into the political aspect of 
government ownership and draw our conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1-2  
Topic introduction and 
presentation of SAS AB 
 
 
Chapter 3-4 
Theoretical framework 
Chapter 5-6 
Historical performance 
and strategic analysis 
Chapter 7-8 
EBITDAR forecast and 
value estimation of SAS AB  
Chapter 9 
Validity and conclusion 
Figure 1: Paper structure 
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2 Overview of the airline industry and SAS AB 
 
In the following part we present an overview of the airline industry and SAS AB’s history. 
SAS AB’s home market competitors are also briefly presented. AB is Swedish for ―stock 
company‖ and the company will from here on only be referred to as SAS. 
2.1 The airline industry 
 
The first air passenger service began in 1910 when airships started operating between several 
German cities. The first scheduled passenger flight by plane took place four years later in the 
United States when a small company transported passengers across Tampa Bay in a two-seat 
Benoit airplane for five dollars.  In the coming years the passenger air service developed 
faster in Europe than in the USA. This was partly because of the First World War when the 
military saw the usefulness of airplanes and transportation by plane was the only possibility 
because of destroyed roads and railways. European colonies that had been conquered in far 
distant places also helped the air transport industry to boom in Europe because of the 
shortening of travel time. In the United States the infrastructure was not harmed in world war 
one and the railroad network was fast, reliable and much more comfortable than air planes at 
the current time. Therefore the demand for air transportation was relatively low. What saved 
the development of the air transport industry in USA in the early days was the government’s 
decision to use airplanes in mail transport (Morrell 2009).  
 
During world war two the airplane production increased dramatically and so did the available 
technology. The military spending on development of aircrafts did wonders for the civil air 
transportation industry. The planes became bigger, faster and more comfortable. By the mid-
1950s more people were crossing the Atlantic Ocean by plane than by boat.  The industry 
continued to grow enormously in the second half of the 20
th
 century. The number of 
passengers increased from 177 million in 1965 to about 2.1 billion in 2007 (Morrell 2009) .  
 
The air transport industry was in the early days mainly state controlled. High investment 
expenditures and strict air regulations can be viewed as main reasons for this. As a result 
some airline companies are still wholly or partly owned by governments.  USA did not 
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deregulate the market until 1978 and in EU the deregulation was made in three major leaps 
between 1988-1991 (Lian 2006). 
 
There are two different types of airline route systems. The traditional one is the ―Hub-and-
spoke‖. In this system the airline uses one or several large airports as a hub. This means that 
there are fewer direct flights between smaller cities but they are still connected through the 
hub airport. This way they can have fewer flights and fill the capacity on the aircrafts in a 
more efficient way. The drawback is the increased flight time for passengers since they need 
to change plane at the hub airport. Most older and traditional airlines belong in this category.   
 
The other type of airline system is the ―point-to-point‖ system where passengers are flown 
directly to their destination. In this category we find the relatively new ―no-frills-low-cost‖ 
airlines. Because of the disadvantages with the traditional ―Hub-and-spoke‖ system and the 
deregulation of the air traffic, new market possibilities appeared. This resulted in a boom of 
new airline companies in Europe around the year 2000 and a dramatically increase in direct 
flights. 
  
2.2 SAS Group 
 
The SAS group was founded on the first of August in 1946 when the flag carriers of 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway formed a partnership to handle intercontinental traffic. In 
September the same year the first intercontinental flight took place from Stockholm to New 
York. Two years later the cooperation was extended to also include European traffic. The 
SAS consortium as it appears today was established in 1951. When the fully integrated SAS 
group was founded it was completely government controlled by the Danish (2/7 share), 
Swedish (3/7 share) and Norwegian (2/7 share) government.  
 
In the beginning the cooperation only included air traffic. After the startup the company had a 
steady growth in number of departures. In 1960 the SAS Group extended its business area and 
opened its first hotel, the ―SAS Royal Hotel Copenhagen‖. One year later another area of 
activity was included in the corporation, ―SAS Catering‖. The business area was expanded 
further in the 1970s when SAS bought Nyman and Schultz Nordic travel agency. The hotel 
division expanded outside Scandinavia for the first time in 1980 when the company 
established a hotel in Kuwait.  
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The firs stock listing found place in 1967 when the Norwegian part of SAS (DNL) become 
stock listed on Oslo Stock Exchange (SAS web page 2009). SILA, which was the Swedish 
part of SAS, was listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1980.  
 
In 1981 when Jan Carlzon became the new director of SAS the company was facing large 
financial difficulties and was publicly known for always being delayed. His focus on 
customer service, quality and decentralization of the organization revolutionized the airline 
industry. Carlzon worked towards a vision of making SAS the preferred company for business 
travelers and implemented necessary actions to reach the target. For the first time in 17 years 
SAS could in 1982 present a financial result with surplus.  In 1983 the Air Transport World 
named SAS the Airline of the Year (SAS web page 2009). 
  
2001 become a tough year for SAS. The Linate accident in Milano, the most terrible accident 
in SAS’ history, and the terror attack on September 11 were both contributing factors. In 
2002/2003 the economic situation worsened, and many employees were dismissed. The 
situation became a bit better in 2005 – 2007 when the company again reached account 
surplus. Unfortunately the situation changed in 2008 and the annual result was again in 
deficit. 
 
Today the SAS Group is the 4
th
 largest aviation company in Europe. In 2007 39million 
passengers flew with SAS to almost 150 destinations. The Company has over 1500 daily 
departures, and their vision is to be ―the obvious choice‖. Through cooperating airlines the 
SAS Group will offer flexible and value-for-money air travel with great freedom of choice to 
both business and leisure travelers in Northern Europe. The SAS Groups main objectives are 
to create value for its owners and to achieve a 7 % EBT margin, equivalent to a cash flow 
return on invested capital (CFROI) of at least 25 % of earnings or approximately SEK 4 
billion (SAS Group Annual Report 2009). 
 
Today 50 % of the SAS shares is owned by the Scandinavian governments of Sweden 
(21.4%), Norway (14.3 %) and Denmark (14.3 %)). The remaining 50 % are publicly traded 
on Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Oslo stock exchange (SAS web page 2009) . 
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2.3 Competitors 
 
SAS’ home market is characterized by a few, but large competitors. Norwegian (Norway and 
Sweden), Cimber-Sterling (Denmark) and Finnair (Finland) are the three main competitors in 
their respectively countries. Below is an illustration of SAS’ market shares in the Nordic 
countries.  
 
 
Figure 2: SAS’ market shares (SAS Group Annual Report 2009) 
 
2.3.1 Norwegian  
 
Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA was established in January 1993. In the beginning their fleet 
consisted of 3 Fokker F-50 and they operated routes on behalf of Braathens S.A.F.E. 
Braathens was acquired in 2001 by SAS. In 2002 Norwegian established their first 
independent route between Stavanger and Newcastle. This was quickly closed down because 
of unprofitability. Even thought their first route was unsuccessful it was their first effort to 
compete with SAS. Soon later 7 new Boeing 737-300 were acquired and put into traffic 
between the major Norwegian cities. In 2003 the company was stock listed. 
 
After continuous growth and success in the Norwegian market Norwegian expanded their 
geographical presence by acquiring the Swedish company FlyNordic. FlyNordic is today 
branded as Norwegian.se and is SAS’ largest competitor on domestic traffic in Sweden. 
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Today Norwegian employs 1.400 people and operates 150 routes to 82 destinations. The 
passenger number grew from 1.2 million in 2003 to 9.1 million in 2008. By the end of 2008 
Norwegian had 37 operational Boeing 737s and further 42 in order with excepted delivery 
between 2009 and 2014. 
 
 Norwegian is positioned as a low cost company and the largest equity holder and CEO is the 
charismatic Bjørn Kjos who holds about 30 % of the shares. 
    
2.3.2 Cimber-Sterling   
 
In 1950 Ingolf L. Nielsen bought Sønderjyllands aviation which later became Cimber Air. In 
the early days they operated taxi planes between the two Danish towns Søderborg and 
Copenhagen. During the 1960s’ the company continuously upgraded its fleet to carry 
additional passengers. Cimber, SAS and Maersk Air establish a new company called Danair 
in 1971. Its intension was to develop and strengthen domestic aviation in Denmark. This co-
operation came to an end in 1995, but SAS and Cimber resumed their partnership the same 
year. 
 
By February 2003 Cimber was again hundred percent family-owned after they bought back 
the remaining shares from SAS. Trough the last decade Cimber has grown significantly and in 
December 2008 Cimber acquired parts of the bankrupt company Sterling including its well 
known brand. This resulted in a change of name to Cimber-Sterling and an expansion of 20 
new routes from Copenhagen, Billund and Aalborg.  
 
2.3.3 Finnair 
 
Finnair is one of the world’s oldest airline companies still alive. The company was founded 
on the 1
st
 of November 1923 and has today 9.500 employees. Finnair’s major shareholder is 
the Finnish government which owns 55.8 % of the shares. Today the company transports a 
high number of passengers from Europe to Asia as a result of Finland’s geographical position. 
In addition the company offers several daily departures to major European cities and 13 
domestic destinations.  
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In 2008 Finnair carried over 8 million passengers where about 1.5 million were on domestic 
flights. The company’s fleet is today counting 63 aircrafts. Finnair is the main competitor of 
Blue1 which is an individual branded company wholly owned by the SAS Group. 
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3. Theory 
 
In this chapter we will introduce theoretical issues that will be used in later analysis. 
3.1 Valuation methods 
 
There are basically three different valuation techniques. Those are fundamental valuation, 
comparison valuation and option-based valuation. These must not be looked upon as different 
options but more like supplements (Kinserdal 2008). 
3.1.1 Fundamental valuation 
 
Fundamental valuation is based on the analysis of underlying or fundamental conditions. By 
this we mean the use of the actual income and balance sheet of the firm to estimate its value. 
There are two main types of fundamental valuation. The first one is the discounted cash flow 
method. With this method future cash flows are estimated based on historical performance 
and assumptions about the future. Then cash flows are discounted with a suitable cost of 
capital to find the net present value. The second type is the net asset value where balance 
sheet assets are calculated at market values and then reduced with net debt.  
3.1.2 Comparison valuation 
 
Peer review is a valuation method where a key ratio for one or several companies is used in 
comparison with the same value of another comparable company to calculate its value. Such a 
popular ratio is the P/E 
1
 ratio. If value was driven by income only this would have been a 
good estimator. The P/E ratio of one or several companies could be solved with respect to P 
and then used to find the price of a second company
2
.  The problem with this ratio is that 
aspects such as growth potential and capital structure are overlooked. One multiple that does 
take this into account is the enterprise value to earnings before interest, tax and appreciation 
(EBITA). This gives: 
 
 
𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐴
 
Formula (1) 
 
                                                 
1
 P/E=Price/earnings 
2
 P(company B)=E(company B)x[P(company A)/E(company A) 
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As we see, this is a complex ratio and we need to adjust the EBITA for different accounting 
rules and one-off gains and losses to reflect the ―normalized‖ EBITA. The EBITA should 
ideally be forward looking as well to reflect future potential. This also has to be done in a 
fundamental cash flow analysis and can therefore be a good tool for analyzing the result when 
using that technique (McKinsey & Company 2005)  
3.1.3 Option- based valuation 
 
Option-based valuation is used when a company has an opportunity to get a positive cash flow 
in the future, but have not yet ―exercised‖ the option. This could, for example, be an oil 
company that has bought an oil field at sea that are not profitable at today’s oil price, but still 
they have the option to develop the field if the oil price rises. The option value is decided by 
the intrinsic value
3
, time to maturity and the volatility of the underlying asset. Option value is 
found by using formulas such as the Black-Scholes or by using binominal modeling (Brealey, 
Myers and Allen 2006).  
3.2 Choice of valuation method 
 
Which method to use in a valuation depends on the company’s attributes. It depends on the 
age of the company, industry and the assumption of continuing business. A young company 
with no or small earnings or a company in the high-tech industry might be suited for an option 
based or comparison valuation because the cash flows are potentially hard to estimate. If we 
assume that a company will terminate their operations and sell all their assets a net asset value 
should be a good choice. But if we assume continuing businesses and that the company is in 
an old and mature industry there should be possible to make qualified estimates of the future 
cash flows based on historical data and forecasts. This we assume is the case with the airline 
industry, so our approach to valuate SAS will be through a fundamental cash flow analysis.  
3.3 Normalization of historical income 
 
To estimate future cash flows we need to investigate how the company has performed in the 
past.  By analyzing historical data we can discover trends on how the business has performed 
earlier and then get a better idea of how the cash flows will look in the future. To make it 
easier to discover these trends adjustments sometimes have to be made to the past income 
statements. Because of various reasons the income statement is not always representative for 
the underlying core business. There are three reasons for this (Kinserdal 2008). First of all the 
                                                 
3
 Intrinsic value= Difference between exercise price and current value 
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different accounting principles do not always give the best values for our analysis purpose. 
Examples of this are the handling of pension costs, leasing, appropriations and value 
corrections. Secondly the management occasionally tries to manipulate the accounting for 
their own benefit. This is often referred to as earnings management. This could for example 
happen when a manager wants to meet a specific target to satisfy the owners and keep his job 
safe. This could be done not only outside the accounting rules but also within. Some of the 
items in the account are set by judgment. This is for example write-offs, appropriation for loss 
and the choice of capitalizing an item or taking the cost instantly like you can do with 
research and development (R&D). Thirdly there are usually a few none recurring items. This 
could be loss or gains from sale of assets, one time write-downs, restructuring costs and 
financial items like currency loss. All in all there should not be made too many adjustments to 
the historical numbers. Plus and minuses tends to equal each other out so the focus should be 
on the large none recurring items that make an significant impact on the income sheet.   
3.4 Leasing 
 
There are two types of leasing: Operational and financial leasing. Financial leasing is no 
threat for the analyst since the leased item is treated as an asset in the balance sheet and the 
debt-part is treated as a liability. Operational leasing however is a threat because it appears in 
the income statement and consists of both a depreciation-part and an interest-part which is 
very hard to separate. Firstly the interest-part end up as an operating cost which is a problem 
when you want to analyze the operational income. But even worse is that ―debt‖ is hidden 
from the balance sheet. We call it debt because the leasing taker has a contracted obligation to 
pay for the leasing costs over a given period. This is usually not an issue when valuating most 
companies, since operational leasing is usually very small and not significant. But for airliners 
this is a big issue. They often have large operational leasing costs. The result is that a large 
debt-equivalent liability is left out of the balance sheet. This will lead to wrong equity/debt 
ratios when calculating the cost of capital
4
 and also affect the risk analyze. The solution is to 
capitalize the value of the operating leases as part of invested capital and add the estimated 
interest part to the income sheet. This way the leased assets are treated as if they were owned 
and financed with straight debt (McKinsey & Company 2005).  
 
The capitalized value of operating leases needs to be deducted as a nonequity claim. This 
value can be found with the following formula: 
                                                 
4
 See chapter 3.7 
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𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 = 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
=  
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
(𝑘𝑑 +
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒)
 
Formula (2) 
Where: 
𝑘𝑑= Cost of debt 
3.5 Forecasting 
 
When buying a share of a company the owner receive a right to receive his part of the future 
free cash flows. Therefore the theoretic value of this share or the entire company equals the 
sum of all the future cash flows. Based on historical income, strategic analysis, industry trends 
and macro factors future cash flows are estimated in the discounted cash flow valuation 
method. Budgeting and forecasting is not an exact science, but are more qualified guessing. 
The more background information and knowledge that are gathered on the company and 
industry, the more likely are the forecasts to be accurate. But there will always be so called 
extreme events that are impossible to predict. Examples of this are the impact of 9/11
5
 on the 
airline industry and the outburst of the Severe Acute Respirator Syndrome (SARS) that 
slowed the intercontinental traffic to Asia. 
  
An important question is the length of the time horizon to be used in the budgeting process. 
The further out we go in time the harder it gets to estimate correct cash flows. Theoretically 
you should at least use as many years as it takes for the company to reach steady state 
(Kinserdal 2008). With steady state is meant the point where the company is believed to reach 
a constant growth.  How long this will take depends on both the industry and the company. If 
for example the industry or company is young it will take several years to reach its full 
potential, but still it will not grow in eternity. In this case a long forecast horizon is necessary, 
perhaps 10 years or more, and as a result the estimated cash flows will be very uncertain. If 
the company however is old, and in a well established industry, only a few years of forecasts 
is necessary since the company most probably already is in steady state. Huge restructuring 
processes and fundamental changes in the industry (in for example technology) speaks on the 
                                                 
5
 Terrorist attack on the world trade center in New York done by hijacked airplanes in 2001 
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other side for a long forecast horizon. Ideally 6-10 years should be used in any case, but 3-5 
years are more normal (Kinserdal 2008).   
3.6 Tax 
 
A troublesome issue in valuation is corporate taxes. The reason for this is the differences 
between financial reporting and tax reporting (White, Sondhi og Fried 1998). With financial 
reporting there are more freedom in choice of estimates and accounting principles. The tax 
reporting system however is left with little room for judgment. Because of this we see a 
difference between tax expenses and tax payables in the financial statement which leads to the 
term deferred tax. 
 
 Deferred tax can either be seen as a liability or an asset to pay more or less tax in the future. 
An example of how the differences between financial and tax reporting occurs is depreciation. 
In the financial reporting the assets are often depreciated in a straight line, while in the tax 
report ―reducing balance method of depreciation‖ has to be used. This will lead to increased 
tax payable in the first years and a tax asset in the balance sheet. But let’s say a new asset is 
bought to replace the old one before the deferred tax is canceled out and this happens over and 
over. This will lead to a permanent deferred tax asset until all the assets are sold. When all the 
assets are sold there are no cash flows left to valuate and continuing business is a condition 
for the discounted cash flow method. Together with other issues such as different tax rates 
between countries, income or loss that are not taxable, special tax discount rules
6
, and none 
tax refundable expenses
7
  the effective tax rate is not equal to the statuary tax rate
8
 (Revsine, 
Collins og Johnson 2005). This makes it a lot harder to predict the future cash flow after tax 
of a company. Especially if the company does not have a history of steady state income so 
that the tax actually paid can be studied and by that derive the effective tax rate. The statutory 
tax rate in Norway is for example 28 %, but the average effective tax rate is calculated to be 
around 25 % (Kinserdal 2008). 
 
 The effective tax rate is often noted in the financial report and can be of some help, but it 
often varies a lot from one year to another and includes previous loss that reduces taxable 
                                                 
6
 For example tax discount on research and development costs 
7
 For example entertainment expenses 
8
 Tax rate for corporations set by law 
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income. Because of the difficulties of calculating effective tax rates practitioners often use 
statutory tax rate and adjust it with thumb rules. 
 
3.7 Cost of capital 
 
Although costs are normally thought of as cash paid out, cash not received have the exactly 
same wealth effect. The amount of cash invested in an airplane could for example instead be 
invested in a government bond with a given payoff. This payoff represents an alternative cost 
of capital. When valuating an investment we must therefore deduct the cash flows with the 
cost of capital (Patterson and Cleveland 1995).  
 
There are five determinants of the cost of capital. The first one is the real risk-free rate. This 
reflects the price that investors charge to exchange current consumption for future 
consumption. The second one is the nominal risk-free rate. Because of inflation it is necessary 
for investors to price securities in a way that protects their purchasing power from increasing 
prices. The third one is the investment horizon and term structure. The return required by 
investors to reduce their consumption today may vary with the investment horizon. The fourth 
one is the risk premium. The risk premium reflects the investor’s subjective attitude towards a 
variety of investment uncertainties over the investment horizon. These uncertainties are 
business risks, financial risks, inflation uncertainty, interest rate uncertainty and liquidity risk 
(Patterson and Cleveland 1995). The fifth one is taxes and transaction costs. Different 
investments might have different tax rates and transaction costs that need to be taken into 
account when calculating the alternative cost of capital.  
 
There are two major capital classes: Equity and debt. The cost of these capital sources must be 
set individually. To do this theoretically correct is almost impossible because of the 
complexity of the real world. But there are simplified models available that are proven to give 
good approximations. The most common model used to estimate the cost of equity is the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The standard version is given by:  
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𝐸(𝑅𝑗 ) = 𝑅𝑓 + (𝐸 𝑅𝑚  − 𝑅𝑓)𝛽𝑗  
 
Formula (3) 
Where: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑗 ) =  Expected return on asset j.  
 𝑅𝑓 = The nominal risk free rate  
𝐸 𝑅𝑚  =  Expected market return on the value − weighted market portfolio of all risky assets  
 
𝛽𝑗  = Measure of the degree to which 𝑅𝑗  changes as a result of changes in 𝑅𝑚  
 
The cost of debt is less than the cost of equity. Lenders are not owners in the company and 
therefore get no voting rights or dividends. But on the other hand they get a fixed income 
every year and have first right on the company’s cash flow.  If the company cannot meet the 
lenders yearly demand they will have to bankrupt. Since a company has the option to default 
on their debt the cost of debt consist of three elements. The first one is the nominal risk-free 
rate and the second one is a risk premium which is proportional to the probability of default. 
Thirdly the tax shield from debt must be removed from the total cost. When analyzing a 
company the cost of debt is a lot easier to obtain since it is determined by the bank or lenders 
and is reported in the financial statement.  
 
The cash flow of a company is a result of the investments done in the past. Since these 
investments are financed by several sources of capital there is a need to use a model that takes 
this into account to find the total cost of capital. The most commonly model used for this is 
the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC): 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝐸
𝑉
∗ 𝑅𝐸 +
𝐷
𝑉
∗ 𝑅𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝐶) 
Formula (4) 
 
Where:  
𝑅𝐸  = cost of equity  
𝑅𝑑  = cost of debt  
E = market value of the firm's equity  
D = market value of the firm's debt  
V = E + D  
E/V = percentage of financing that is equity  
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D/V = percentage of financing that is debt  
𝑇𝐶  = corporate tax rate  
 
What the model does is to take the cost of each type of capital and then weigh it to its 
proportion of the total capital to find the weighted average cost of capital. The largest problem 
with this model is that it uses market value of equity as an input. Equity value is exactly what 
we want to calculate so we get a circular problem.  
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4 Strategic framework 
 
Identification of a company’s competitive position and advantage are the basics for a strategic 
analysis. A strategic analysis consists of an external and an internal analysis (Roos, Krogh and 
Roos 2002). 
4.1 External analysis 
 
External analysis contributes in the understanding of how a company is strategic positioned. It 
is important to form an image of the company’s surroundings. The question is whether the 
company operates independently or is under constant pressure from fast and unexpected 
environmental changes. PEST-analysis and Porters five forces are good tools for enlightening 
these areas (Roos, Krogh and Roos 2002) 
4.1.1 PEST-Analysis 
 
PEST-analysis is based on factors that have an effect on a company’s operations. The analysis 
is used as a tool to identify key factors in the surroundings, and among other factors, to get a 
clearer view of vital conditions with importance to the company’s long-term development. It 
can also constitute a contribution to how external factors have different influence on the 
organisation and its competitors. The figure below illustrates how the macro environment 
directly influences some or all forces in Porter’s competition model. The following 
presentation is based on theory from Strategic Management Theory (Hill and Jones 2008) and 
the Norwegian book ―Innføring i Strategi‖ (Roos, Krogh and Roos 2002).  
 
 
Figure 3: PEST-analysis 
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Political and legal forces 
Changes in legislation and regulations significantly affect managers and companies. Since 
regulation influence competitive structure in an industry, firms often seek to influence the 
regulations that governments enact by a number of means. In larger parts of the industrialized 
world, there has been a strong trend towards deregulation of industries previously controlled 
by the state. This also includes the airline industry. 
 
Economical forces 
The growth rate of the economy, interest rates, currency exchange rates, and inflation are the 
four most important factors in the macro environment. Economical growth affects customers’ 
expenditures, and this again affects competition and possible profitability in the industry. A 
company’s investments are partly a result of the level of interest rates. The level of borrowing 
and spending are strongly dependent on the price of money. The interest rates are also 
important to a company’s ability to raise funds and invest in new assets because it is decisive 
for the cost of capital. Currency exchange rates have a direct impact on the competitiveness of 
a company’s products in the global marketplace. Price inflation affect all the other factors, 
and the key characteristic is that it makes the future less predictable. 
 
 
Technological forces 
A technological change must be viewed as both an opportunity and a threat. Changes can on 
one hand result in new product possibilities, but on the other hand make established products 
obsolete overnight. Over the last decades technological changes has accelerated. Perhaps the 
most important implication of this is the reduced barriers of entry as technology is constantly 
changing. The result is both lower consumer prices and profit margins because of increased 
intensity of rivalry. 
 
Social and demographic forces 
Demographic forces are outcomes of changes in the characteristics of a population, such as 
age, gender, ethnic origin, race and social class (Hill and Jones 2008). The percentage of 
women who have entered the work force, have as an example increased in many countries. 
Social forces refer to changes in values and lifestyle that have an impact on the industry. An 
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example could be changes in travel preferences because of increased terror danger or natural 
catastrophes. A natural consequence is reduced demand of air travel owing to fear. 
4.1.2 Five-Forces Analysis 
 
In the following part we have used theory from the book ―Economics of Strategy‖ (Besanko 
2007). The five-forces framework is a tool to assess the current status quo and likely 
evolution of an industry. The five forces included are internal rivalry, entry, substitute and 
complementary products, supplier power, and buyer power. The matter of judgment is 
whether the forces is sufficient strong to reduce or eliminate industry profits. In the following 
presentation the threat of substitutes is not included because we today do not consider it to be 
of great importance for our following analysis of SAS. 
 
 
Figure 4: Porter’s five forces 
 
 
Internal rivalry 
The degree of rivalry is of strong importance with regards to the competitive conditions in the 
market. Rivalry can reduce companies’ economical profit severely, and competition intensity 
can depend both upon price and nonprice dimensions. Both types of competitions may reduce 
profits. Price competition can result in lower price-cost margins, while nonprice competition 
on the other hand, can increase fixed costs trough e.g. new product development and/or 
marginal cost trough e.g. adding product features. 
 
Companies’ incentives to engage in price competition depend on the likelihood of increased 
market shares. In markets with an abundance of companies of the same size and influence on 
total market supply, the rivalry is typically intense. Stagnant or declining markets can also 
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lead to intensified rivalry because companies that wish to increase their market share must do 
this on the expense of established competitors.  
 
When suppliers are offering undifferentiated products, buyers have a low switching cost. This 
can often result in a price war between the suppliers and thereby cut margins. A price war will 
more likely develop when prices and terms of sale are unobservable. In this situation it is 
harder for competitors to quickly adjust to changes which make it more profitable for the 
initiator.  
 
Entry 
Intruders are new participants in established markets. Motivation for entering a market can 
stem from the fact that one of the already existing participants is earning above-normal 
economic profit.  If no entry barriers exist, new participants will enter the market as long as 
there still is profit to gain.  
 
Intruders affect existing participant’s profit in two ways. Firstly additional suppliers must 
share existing market demand. Secondly intruders will decrease market concentration, and 
intensify internal rivalry. 
 
To what degree entry of new firms constitute a threat to existing participants depends on the 
barriers to entry. Barriers to entry can be economies of scale, product differentiation and 
government regulations. 
 
The threat of buyers 
The rational costumer always wants to maximize his value for money. If the buyers get to 
much power it will be a threat for the companies in the industry as they demand lower prices. 
For customers to be a threat, one or more of the following assumptions have to be fulfilled: 
 
 A small numbers of buyers 
 Undifferentiated or standardized products 
 Product costs are a significant percentage of a buyer’s total costs 
 Buyers do not earn a significant economic profit 
 Possibility for backward vertical integration 
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The threat of suppliers  
Any above-normal profits can be moved from a company to their suppliers if they increase 
their prices or reduce the quality of their supplies. Main reasons that suppliers constitute a 
threat are: 
 
 Suppliers’ industry are dominated by a small number of firms 
 Suppliers sell unique or highly differentiated products 
 Suppliers are not threaten by substitutes 
 Suppliers threaten forward vertical integration 
 Firms are not important customers for suppliers 
 
4.2 Internal Analysis 
 
The main objective with an internal analysis is to identify a company’s core strategy and see 
if it gives any competitive advantage. A competitive advantage is to have a profitability that is 
higher than the business sector’s average. The core strategy is defined as a mixture of 
resources, competence and relations that a company controls which gives them costs- or 
differentiation benefits (Reve 1992). 
 
A resource allows a company to create value for its customers and can be financial, physical, 
social, human, technological or organizational factors. Distinctive company competence is 
more likely to occur the more firm specific and difficult to imitate their resources are. 
Distinctive competency also depends on a company’s capability to coordinate and put their 
resources into a productive use. Capabilities are the way a company leads its internal 
processes to reach their goals. These skills must be resided in company rules, routines, culture 
and procedures to be sustainable. The relations are illustrated in Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5: Internal processes 
 
In the following two analysis tools are presented. These are a resource analysis called SVIMA 
and a position analysis of efficiency, quality, innovation and responsiveness to customers. 
These are all factors that create sustainable competitive advantage in a company. 
 
4.2.1 Position-Analysis 
 
In the following part we have used theory from the book ―Strategic Management Theory‖ 
(Hill and Jones 2008). 
 
Efficiency 
Efficiency (output divided by input) measures the quantity of input that is required to produce 
a given output. Outputs are goods and service that the business produces while input includes 
production factors such as labor, capital, management and technological know-how. The 
higher efficiency, the less input is required to produce a given output. Capital productivity and 
employee productivity are components that are especially important for many companies’ 
efficiency. In general high productivity leads to greater efficiency and lower costs. 
 
Quality 
Apprehension of quality is based on the understanding of utility. Superior quality depends on 
consumers emphasize on specific attributes to a given product. Attributes can be divided 
between quality as excellence and quality as reliability. Examples of quality as excellence are 
attributes such as design, styling, aesthetic appeal, feature and function, and level of service. 
Reliability implies trust on products to do their job and rarely, if ever, break down.  The figure 
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below describes the interaction between different attributes of quality and how they together 
form total quality.  
 
Figure 6: The quality chain 
 
When excellence or reliability is ―built‖ into a product, the consumers utility is increased, and 
they will pay more to consume or own it. Product quality has a twofold impact on competitive 
advantage. Firstly producing high-quality products increase the utility to consumers, which 
gives the company the choice to charge a higher price. Secondly reliable products create 
greater efficiency and lower unit costs. 
 
Innovation 
Innovation refers to the action of creating a new process or product. Product innovation 
involves development of new products, or products that have superior attributes to existing 
products. This type of innovation creates value through expanded utility to costumers and 
again increases companies’ pricing options. A result of process innovation is the possibility to 
increase margins by lowering product costs or change cost structure. Innovation is important 
because it gives a company something that is unique and hard to imitate. This process is 
maybe one of the most important building blocks of competitive advantage. Uniqueness opens 
up the possibility to differentiate. 
 
Responsiveness to customers  
By identifying and satisfying costumers needs, companies can better attribute utility to their 
service or products. Customizing goods and services to the unique demands of the customers 
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is an important part of responsiveness and has received an increased focus over the past years. 
An aspect of responsiveness, which has received increasing attention, is customer’s response 
time. This is the time it takes from the costumer to recognize his need to the product or 
service is delivered. Through great responsiveness companies build brand loyalty and create 
opportunities to charge a premium.  
 
4.2.2 SVIMA-Analysis 
 
SVIMA is an analytical tool to map the possibility for a company resource to create and retain 
competitive advantage.  Competitive advantage is defined by a long-term return above 
average in the relevant product market. Resources can be viewed as the fundamental source 
for competitive advantage or disadvantage. Resources are holdings of inputs which affect a 
companies’ relative ability to implement a product market strategy (Jakobsen and Lien 2001). 
If a resource should create an abnormal high return, the resource has to be rare, important, not 
possible to imitate, and possible to mobilize and appropriate. If a resource is seldom, 
competitors do not have the particular resource in same quantity and quality. Important 
resources have high impact on company costs, or costumers’ willingness to pay, or both. To 
be impossible to imitate, competitors must not have the ability to copy or replace the resource.  
Mobilization is process of converting resources into economic value. If the creation of value 
shall have any meaning to a company they must capture it. The figure below explains the 
degree of importance resources have to a firm based on the five mention characteristics: 
 
 
Table 1: Resource matrix 
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5 Historical performance of SAS 
 
5.1 Regrouping of the financial statement  
 
SAS’ reported financial statement is not very informative and cannot be used directly in an in 
debt financial analysis. Both the income and expenditure are consolidated and says little about 
the main income and cost drivers (except from payroll expenses). Some of the Leasing cost is 
also included in the operating income while some leasing cost is capitalized in the balance 
statement. Leasing where in principal all the risk and benefits stays with the leaser is treated 
as operational leasing and is expensed on an ongoing basis. As discussed in chapter 3.3 and 
3.4 we have reorganized the statement of income to be more informative and removed the 
leasing costs from the operational income for the purpose of analysis. We have mainly used 
data from 2001-2008 in historical analysis because 2001 was the year the SAS share was 
single listed in its current form.  
 
The SAS Group has been through heavy restructuring in the past years. Companies, company 
shares and divisions have been bought and sold and that makes the financial statements a bit 
random. But fortunately income from discontinued operations is reported separately and for 
example excludes Spanair which is now sold and have been one of the largest sources of 
deficit. With SAS’ new ―Core Strategy‖ they will only keep their Nordic business divisions. 
As far as possible we have tried to only include this part of their historical business 
performance. We have not adjusted for any abnormal income or expenditures posts because 
none of importance is reported. However both unexplained costs and income which are stated 
as other income and expenditures are relatively high. For income it makes up around 7 % of 
revenue and for expenditures it is around 15 % of total revenue last three years. Because it has 
been quite stable during the last years it should not be a major threat for the analysis.   
5.2 Passenger traffic  
 
The most important revenue driver for SAS is the passenger traffic. Over 70 % of total 
revenue derives directly from ticket sales on scheduled flights. If we include charter revenue, 
in-flight sales and other indirect effects the number is closer to 80 %.  
 
The total market for air transport has continued to grow over the last half century. Passenger 
growth has increased 5 % on average over the period. Distance flown has increased relatively 
34 
 
more than passenger numbers which indicates that people continue to fly longer distances 
(Morrell 2009).  
  
The above average growth the industry has encountered in the last two decades can be related 
to the deregulation of air traffic, introduction of low-cost airlines (making air travel more 
affordable) and the rapid economic growth of populous countries like China and India. The 
increased globalization has also played an important role.  
 
Although the air traffic has continued to grow rapidly over a long time period it is also highly 
dependent on macro factors and business cycles. Figure 7 below shows the relation between 
passenger growth and periods with recession. Revenue passenger kilometers (RPK) is 
calculated by multiplying the number of paying passengers with the distance they flow and is 
a passenger volume measure. The growth of the RPK follows the business cycles closely and 
indicates that air trips is something that people tends to reduce during periods of recession. 
This could be because private individuals go on less expensive vacations and that businesses 
try to use more fare distance communication instead of meeting face to face to cut costs. Right 
now after the burst of the financial bubble most of the world is again facing recession. 
Quarterly data have already shown a significant drop in air passenger traffic and the outlook is 
grim.  
 
 
Figure 7: Business cycles and passenger traffic relationship (IATA 2008) 
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2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 Average 
Destinations served 176 158 147 147 146 130 123 128 146,7 
Passengers(mill.) 30,9 31,4 32,4 41,0 38,3 36,4 38,8 25,1 35,6 
TLF(%) 72,3 74,5 73,6 71,4 68,6 67,5 68,7 62,7 70,9 
Table 2: Traffic-related key figures for SAS 
Table 2 displays SAS’ passenger development over the last eight years. Passenger numbers 
have increased significantly over the time period together with the number of cities served. 
This is the result of continues market growth and acquisitions of other airliners. In 2001 the 
only Norwegian competitor at the time, Braathens, was acquired and in 2002 SAS also 
became a majority owner of Spanair. Then in 2003 49 % of Estonian Air was bought and 
finally in 2008 the big loss project Spanair was agreed to be sold. This has inversed the 
passenger growth from 2006 as Spanair passengers are not reported. With all this activity it is 
not easy to draw to many conclusions from the passenger numbers but we can conclude that 
SAS flies about 50 %  more passengers today than they did ten years ago and that the 
passenger numbers have slightly dropped the last few years with 2008 partly being a year in 
recession. 
 
An important traffic measure in the airline industry is the passenger load factor (PLF). This 
measure provides information about how much of an airline’s passenger capacity that is being 
used. Airlines have heavy fixed costs and are capital intensive. On a scheduled flight the cost 
of transporting one more passenger is insignificant. Therefore the efficiency in which the 
assets are used is crucially. But it is important to remember that this measure says nothing 
about how much the passengers have paid for their tickets. So an airline that has low PLF but 
a high degree of business passengers flying on full price tickets could be just as profitable. 
Low fare companies that only fly between the largest and most profitable cities usually have 
higher PLF than traditional network companies but are not necessarily any more profitable 
because of lower ticket fares. In Table 2 the total load factor (TLF) ratios for SAS is listed for 
the last eight years. The TLF is similar to the PLF but also includes goods. There has been a 
positive development for this measure since the early 2000s. One reason for this is the 
deregulation of the Nordic aviation industry that gave the company real competition and 
forced the company to be more efficient. Unfortunately the good trend seems to have reversed 
after 2006. Although it is not a dramatic fall the TLF has fallen 1.7 points over the last two 
years. 
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Company  2008 2007 
Norwegian.no 79 80 
Norwegian.se* 79 n.a  
Finnair 75,2 75,8 
Air France KLM** 71,4 70,7 
Brithis Airways 71,2 70,4 
SAS Group 71,2 73 
* Former know as FlyNordic   
** European flights only     
Table 3: PLF ratios for SAS and nearest competitors 
 
Compared to some of SAS’ nearest competitors their passenger load factor is quite similar to 
Air France KLM and British Airways which are other traditional European network 
companies. But in SAS’ local markets in Norway, Sweden and Finland, which are the most 
important, we see that SAS is a bit behind their competitors in passenger efficiency. 
Norwegian which operates in both Norway and Sweden and Finnair which operates in Finland 
have respectively 10 % and 5 % higher PLF.  That Norwegian has this relatively higher PLF 
is no surprise since it is a typical low price airline. Association for European Airlines (AEA) 
presents yearly a report including statistics from 31 major European airlines (Including SAS). 
Their PLF average for 2007 was on an all time high of 76.5 % which is a bit above SAS’ 
result. European aviation had a consistent growth in the PLF numbers which mean that the 
airline industry have become significantly more efficient over the last decades and we believe 
that SAS still have to improve their load factor to keep up with their competitors and improve 
profitability.  
 
Although SAS’ Nordic 9 home market is sparsely populated the Nordic people are flying more 
than their European Nabors. Figure 8 shows trips per capita for different European countries 
and all the Nordic countries is above the EU average of 2.5 trips per capita. The four Nordic 
countries have all together a population of only about 24.5 million (CIA 2009) , but the lack 
of competition from other transport modes and a widely spread population makes it a highly 
attractive market. 
                                                 
9
 Excluding Iceland and associated territories  
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Figure 8: Flights per capita for selected European countries (SAS Group 2009) 
 
5.3 Income 
 
(MSEK) 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 Average 
Passenger revenue 38 103 36 814 36 740 39 346 36 950 38 579 45 778 36 582 38 612 
% of operating revenue 72 % 73 % 73 % 71 % 64 % 67 % 70 % 71 % 70 % 
Charter revenue 1 663 1 927 1 773 4 280 3 773 n.a n.a n.a 2 683 
% of passenger revenue 4 % 5 % 5 % 11 % 10 % n.a n.a n.a 7 % 
Cargo and mail revenue 1 509 1 700 2 102 2 127 2 432 2 620 2 836 2 493 2 227 
% of passenger revenue 4 % 5 % 6 % 5 % 7 % 7 % 6 % 7 % 6 % 
Other traffic revenue 2 159 1 295 1 684 1 767 1 644 5 265 4 454 831 2 387 
% passenger revenue 6 % 4 % 5 % 4 % 4 % 14 % 10 % 2 % 6 % 
Other operating revenue 9 761 8 862 7 854 7 981 13 294 11 290 11 876 11 527 10 306 
% of passenger revenue 26 % 24 % 21 % 20 % 36 % 29 % 26 % 32 % 27 % 
Operating revenue 53 195 50 598 50 153 55 501 58 093 57 754 64 945 51 434 55 209 
% chagen from last year 5 % 1 % -11 % -5 % 1 % -12 % 21 % n.a 0 % 
Table 4: SAS’ historical income (SAS Group Annual Reports 2001-2008) 
 
SAS’ largest source of income comes directly from passenger revenue. Ticket sales on 
scheduled flights have made up around 70 % of total revenue for the last years and have been 
quite stable around this percentage. Revenue from charter flights and cargo and mail revenue 
are both only around 5 % of passenger revenue and therefore not that important. ―Other 
operating revenue‖ is a large post which makes up around 25 % of operating revenue. Precise 
information about this revenue group is only available from the last 4 years and is shown in 
Table 5: Breakdown of ―Other operating revenue‖ below. 
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Other operating revenue 2008 2007 2006 2005 Average 
In-flight sales 519 511 493 588 528 
% of operating revenue 1 % 1,0 % 1,0 % 1,1 % 1 % 
Ground services 1265 1455 1213 1255 1 297 
% of operating revenue 2 % 2,9 % 2,4 % 2,3 % 2 % 
Techinical maintenance 792 973 1147 752 916 
% of operating revenue 1 % 1,9 % 2,3 % 1,4 % 2 % 
Terminal and forward services 1916 1592 1513 1193 1 554 
% of operating revenue 4 % 3,1 % 3,0 % 2,1 % 3 % 
Sales comissions and charges 668 834 820 1020 836 
% of operating revenue 1 % 1,6 % 1,6 % 1,8 % 2 % 
Other  4601 3497 2668 3173 3 485 
% of operating revenue 9 % 6,9 % 5,3 % 5,7 % 7 % 
Table 5: Breakdown of “Other operating revenue” 
After breaking up the ―other operating revenue‖ we can see that ground services and terminal 
and forward services are other income sources that each make up around 2-3 % of total 
income. This is typically support functions that are necessarily for the flight operations. In-
flight sales are insignificant with only 1 % of total revenue. The unexplained ―other operating 
revenue‖ items are relatively unstable and makes up about 7 % of total revenue the last three 
years.  
 
Total operating revenue has been quite unstable over the period and it is therefore hard to 
draw any conclusions. This is of course related to the company’s continuously changes in 
structure and the highly dependences on business cycles. An average growth of nearly 0 % 
over the last eight years is however pretty weak.  
5.4 Expenditures 
 
SAS’ largest operational expenditure is payroll expenses. This is sort of their Achilles heel. 
The wage level in the Scandinavian countries is high, especially in Norway, and as a former 
state owned monopolist the unions stand very strong. This has made salary cuts nearly 
impossible in the past. The payroll expenses have been quite stable over the last years and 
were in 2008 34 % of total revenue. Compared to other companies (Table 6) SAS is as 
expected above all their competitors. Compared to the other network and also formerly state 
owned companies, British Airways and Air France KLM, the percentage is only a few points 
above. But compared to the airlines in their local markets of Norway, Sweden and Finland 
SAS is some way above when it comes to salary cost. Especially compared to Norwegian 
where SAS was 18 percentage points higher in 2008. SAS is as well 10 % higher than Finnair.  
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Payroll expenses in % of total operating cost 2008 2007 
Norwegian 18 % 17 % 
Finair n.a 27 % 
Air France KLM* 34 % 34 % 
Brithis Airways* 32 % 30 % 
SAS Group 36 % 37 % 
* 1.April-31. March      
Table 6: Competitor payroll comparison 
 
Selling costs have dropped significantly over the last years. It went from 5.65 % of revenue to 
only 1.28 % in 2008. Before tickets were mainly purchased through telephone sale or 
agencies. But today more and more tickets are bought directly online which provides no or 
little cost for the airline.  
 
Jet fuel expenses have really exploded over the last years. It has gone from 10 % of operating 
revenue in 2001 to 18 % in 2008. This has to do with the oil price boom we witnessed from 
2004-2008. The oil price went from 30 dollars per barrel in 2004 and peaked at around 145 in 
late June 2008. The 10
th
 of March 2009 the oil price was down to 45 dollars. Increase in oil 
prices has at least two effects on the airlines. First of all there will be a direct effect on 
profitability since many tickets are sold months before the flight so the airline has to pay for 
the increased fuel costs itself. Secondly when the airlines adjust their ticket prices upwards to 
make up for the increased oil price the demand will fall according to micro theory. Since the 
jet fuel cost is measured against the operating revenue the increase shows that SAS is 
suffering greatly from the increased jet fuel price. SAS is hedging around 50 % of their 
expected fuel consumption with different derivatives and this have helped them a bit when the 
oil prices went up but are also costly when the price goes down. 
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Operating expenses 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 Average 
Payroll expenses -18 153 -16 897 -16 229 -18 163 -19 585 -21 927 -22 352 -17 792 -18 887 
% of operating revenue 34,1 % 33,4 % 32,4 % 32,7 % 33,7 % 38,0 % 34,4 % 34,6 % 34,2 % 
Selling costs -680 -660 -641 -997 -1 233 -1 452 -2 825 -2 467 -1 369 
% of operating revenue 1,3 % 1,3 % 1,3 % 1,8 % 2,1 % 2,5 % 4,3 % 4,8 % 2,4 % 
Jet fuel -9 637 -7 554 -7 953 -8 123 -6 252 -4 743 -4 938 -4 254 -6 682 
% of operating revenue 18,1 % 14,9 % 15,9 % 14,6 % 10,8 % 8,2 % 7,6 % 8,3 % 12,3 % 
Government user fees -4 662 -4 316 -4 396 -5 787 -6 139 -5 842 -5 893 -4 203 -5 155 
% of operating revenue 8,8 % 8,5 % 8,8 % 10,4 % 10,6 % 10,1 % 9,1 % 8,2 % 9,3 % 
Catering costs -1 346 -1 373 -1 388 -1 821 -1 783 -2 226 -2 242 -1 735 -1 739 
% of operating revenue 2,5 % 2,7 % 2,8 % 3,3 % 3,1 % 3,9 % 3,5 % 3,4 % 3,1 % 
Handling costs -1 851 -1 776 -1 893 -2 709 -2 539 -2 553 -2 584 -2 228 -2 267 
% of operating revenue 3,5 % 3,5 % 3,8 % 4,9 % 4,4 % 4,4 % 4,0 % 4,3 % 4,1 % 
Technical aircraft maintenance -3 197 -3 144 -3 164 -2 049 -2 233 -2 650 -3 164 -2 733 -2 792 
% of operating revenue 6,0 % 6,2 % 6,3 % 3,7 % 3,8 % 4,6 % 4,9 % 5,3 % 5,1 % 
Data and telecommunications -2 282 -2 219 -2 727 -2 878 -2 985 -2 377 -2 689 -2 646 -2 600 
% of operating revenue 4,3 % 4,4 % 5,4 % 5,2 % 5,1 % 4,1 % 4,1 % 5,1 % 4,7 % 
Other expenses -8 136 -7 640 -6 662 -7 296 -10 876 -10 223 -10 963 -10 217 -9 002 
% of operating revenue 15,3 % 15,1 % 13,3 % 13,1 % 18,7 % 17,7 % 16,9 % 19,9 % 16,2 % 
Operating expenses -49 944 -45 579 -45 033 -49 822 -53 625 -53 993 -57 650 -48 275 -50 490 
% of operating revenue 93,9 % 90,1 % 89,8 % 89,8 % 92,3 % 93,5 % 88,8 % 93,9 % 91,5 % 
Table 7: Historical operating expenses (SAS Group Annual Reports 2001-2008) 
 
Other large expenses for SAS are government user fees and something they call ―other 
expenses‖. Government user fees are not controlled by the company and have been stable 
around 8.5 % of operating revenue the last years. We have not been able to get more 
information of what ―other expenses‖ actually is, but we believe it is related to other revenue 
in the income statement and contain costs like restructuring, goods, office rental and R&D. 
This item have been stable around 15-16 % of operating revenue the last three years and 
should therefore be possible to predict without future information. The rest of the items in 
operating expenses are stable and a quite small and will be given no further attention.  
5.5 Profitability 
 
In general the profitability for airlines has been remarkable low after year 2000. As Figure 9 
shows the operating margins are far below what the industry needs to be genuinely 
sustainable which is estimated to 8 % (AEA 2008). The year of the terror attack in 2001 and 
the year of the SARS outburst in 2003 were especially bad ones. But on the positive side if we 
look away from the extreme events there seems to be a small positive trend upwards for the 
operating margins. This has unfortunately reversed in 2008 when most of the world went into 
recession. The operating margin is what is left of the revenue to cover capital cost and taxes. 
As we see Figure 9 this is on an unacceptable level.  
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Figure 9: World airline’s historical operating margin  
 
Figure 10: SAS’ historical operating margin 
Compared to the rest of the of the world’s flight industry, SAS is doing quite badly. 2005-
2007 was three positive years but besides that it is not looking bright. SAS has set an earnings 
before tax (EBT) target of 7 %. They have been nowhere close to this the last eight years. 
SAS did however see pretty good result in the 1990’s. But this was a time when they almost 
were in a monopoly situation in Scandinavia and in addition the competition in the aviation 
industry has exploded in recent years. With the economic recession we see today, several 
airlines have already gone bankrupt and others have been sold for nearly nothing. What we 
are witnessing is a consolidation of the industry which could lead to better profitability in the 
future. SAS’ former largest competitor in Denmark (Sterling) went bankrupt in late 2008 
which show that competition has been too intense in the Nordic region as well and that 
margins could improve in the future.  
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Figure 11: SAS’ historical net profit (MSEK) 
 
SAS’ net income the last eight years have been nothing but disastrous. There is only one 
exception. In 2006 the net result was over 4 billion Swedish Kroner (BSEK). This was 
however almost in its entirety related to profit from discontinued operations
10
. The same goes 
for the terrible result in 2008. Spanair, which is now sold for one euro, accounted for 5.5 
billion of total losses. At least SAS had weak, but positive results from 2005-2007. This 
shows that it should be possible to create a sustainable profitable airline company out of SAS.   
 
If we take a look at two of the other airline companies operating in SAS home market we see 
that they as well are struggling to obtain impressive results. Both Norwegian and Finnair are 
at about the same level as SAS when it comes to EBIT margin over the last three years. This 
shows that it is not only SAS that are struggling in Scandinavia but also its competitor. It is 
obvious that changes needs to be made to make the airline industry more profitable.  
 
If we look at the profitability from an investor’s perspective one SAS share bought on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange 5 years ago would have given a return of approximately – 65 % 
(without taking the alternative cost of money into account.) The company has not paid 
dividends since it was listed as a single stock in 2001. If you had rather bought an index share 
on the same stock exchange your earnings would be close to zero (excluding dividends). It 
looks like SAS is doing more value destruction than value creation at the moment.  
                                                 
10
 SAS’ hotel division was sold this year with a net profit of 4,5 BSEK 
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5.6 Credit risk 
 
To this point we have only focused on the operations of the company and its ability to create 
value. We will now turn to look at the capital structure and measure the company’s ability to 
meet interest demands and repay debt. The airline industry is capital intensive and therefore 
capital structure is an important part of its operation. Debt burden is important for future 
analysis because heavy dept and pay back difficulties will result in higher risk and thereby 
increased cost of capital. SAS has been given a rating of B by Standard and Poor’s. This 
rating is within the ―speculative grade‖ which is everything below BBB-. Speculative grade is 
a category where the debt issuer generally has the current ability to meet financial 
commitments but are facing significant uncertainties, such as difficult business or financial 
circumstances that could affect credit risk. B rating indicates major economic uncertainties 
(Standard & Poor's 2009) .  
 
5.6.1 Coverage 
 
We will calculate interest coverage by dividing EBITDA by interest. This ratio measures the 
company’s ability to meet short-term financial commitments, using both current profits and 
profits that should be used for replacement capital (McKinsey & Company 2005). Since we 
have chosen to treat operating leasing as financial cost we have added an implicit interest part 
from the operational leasing cost using Formula 2. We solve it with regards to cost of debt 
and can by that find the implicit interest rate on the leased items. This gives us: 
 
𝑘𝑑 =  
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
−
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒
 
 
Formula (5) 
 
Rental expense is the same as leasing cost in the formula and can be found directly in the 
annual report. Asset value however, the value of the leased planes, is a bit more tricky. But 
there is a simple rule of thumb that the capital market uses for financial evaluation of airplane 
leasing (SAS Annual Report 2008). They simply take the leasing cost and multiply it by 7, 
than you will approximately get the value of the leased planes. This 7x multiplier is used by 
SAS as well in their annual report for different value calculations, so we believe it should be 
an acceptable approach for us as well. Asset life value, or the life expectance for air planes, is 
set to 25 years. This is a normal approximation in the industry. Using these assumptions we 
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get an implicit interest rate of 10.3 % on the leased assets. If it is a good idea or not to add this 
implicit interest cost in the coverage calculation is a good question. But either all rental cost 
from leasing should be counted or none. And since some leasing is capitalized and some is not 
it is easier to add rental cost from the none-capitalized since we have little or none 
information about the other. Also when we have all the leasing rental cost includes the total 
interest rates appear as if all assets were owned and we eliminated the problem with changing 
ratio between leased and owned airplanes.  
 
SAS interest coverage rate has improved greatly after the industry downturn in 2001. It was 
below one until 2003 which meant that the company had to use retained earnings to cover 
interest rates. From 2004 and onwards SAS had an sufficient EBITDA result to cover the 
short term financial interest cost but not much was left for the yearly replacement cost of 
assets. In 2008 the rate fell again as a result of a turbulent year. Generally this shows that SAS 
have the ability to repay their short term interest cost which is consistent with their investment 
grade.  
 
Figure 12: SAS’ interest coverage rate 
To find total depreciation costs we have used the same interest approximation for leasing as 
above. The implicit depreciation costs of the leased assets are then added to the depreciation 
cost found in the income statement. Then we can find an EBIT result (excluding nonrecurring 
items) and see what part of the interest costs that are covered by this income measure. Only in 
2007 the ratio was close to 1, meaning that the ordinary income covered the depreciation 
expenses. But still nothing was left for the for the equity owners. The reason for the net 
operating result being positive in recent years is mainly because of income and transactions 
from discontinued operations. 
1,2
1,6
0,9
1,4
1,5 1,5
1,7
1,3
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
45 
 
 
Figure 13: SAS’ EBIT/Interest rate 
 As we see in Figure 13 SAS is struggling to pay their interest rates without having to use 
cash that should have gone to replace depreciating equipment. This can of course not continue 
in the long run and if the management does not change this trend the company should not be 
kept alive in its current state. This also confirms why SAS’ credit rating belongs in the 
―speculative grade‖ category.  
5.6.2 Leverage 
 
 
Figure 14: SAS’ adjusted debt ratio 
 
The SAS Group is heavy leveraged. When the operational leasing is capitalized, using the x7 
rule, the company has a debt/equity ratio of 259 %. This is far above the ratio target of less 
than 100 % (SAS Group 2009). From what we have learned in corporate finance courses high 
leverage is best suited for companies with positive and predictable income. SAS has rarely 
benefited from the tax shield that debt provides because of negative income. The income of 
the company is as well unpredictable because of the industries high dependent on external 
factors. This makes the company vulnerable because it could struggle to pay its debt in 
0,7
1,0
0,1
0,4
0,7
0,9
1,0
0,3
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1,9
2,9 2,9
3,2
2,9
1,7
0,9
2,6
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
46 
 
turbulent times. And right now we are witnessing theory in practice. After last year’s heavy 
losses SAS has renegotiated debt for BSEK 6.5 expiring in 2010-2011 to 2012-2013 (SAS 
Group Annual Report 2009). And as mentioned earlier they are raising BSEK 6 in new equity. 
Some of this will have to be used to cover expected losses in 2009 and then whatever is left to 
repay debt. Over the next five years BSEK 13.7 worth of debt is expiring. This will be 
impossible to pay back if not margins are changed dramatically, which is unlikely in the short 
run, or alternatively new debt or equity is raised. The cost of new debt will most likely be 
even more expensive than the current one as the credit rating has fallen and the renegotiating 
of debt is a bad signal for the capital market. Although the government owners see SAS as an 
important part of their countries’ infrastructure, the risk of bankruptcy should not be 
underestimated. There are others airlines that could operate the routes just as well, if not 
better.  
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6 Strategic analysis of SAS  
 
6.1 External analysis 
 
In the following part we present how environmental factors can change the premises for 
economic profit in the airline industry. 
 
6.1.1 Environmental analysis of SAS’ market area 
 
Consumption is a social force and depends on people’s desire for a good or service. The 
aircraft industry is strongly dependent on people’s desire for travel. Fear and skepticism 
owing to accidents, terrorism and nature catastrophes can result in reduced air travel. In 
business situations telephone meetings and video conferences can replace face-to-face 
meetings. According to SAS annual report from 2001 the incident in New York on the 11
th
 of 
September resulted in an enormous decrease in air passenger traffic. In connection with the 
accident the cost of insurance and air safety also increased considerably. In the period from 
11
th
 September to 31
th
 December the traffic of the AEA-companies (Association of European 
Airlines) fell on average with 31 %. As the figure below describes the industry is highly 
sensitive to unforeseen incidents, conflicts and wars. 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Extreme events and passenger decline (SAS Group Annual Report 2001) 
 
Flying can be viewed as something people only do when they feel they can afford it and must 
be considered as a luxury good according to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1943). 
Owing to this, the airline industry is strongly dependent on business cycles and income level. 
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The median revenue in Norway has increased with 22 % from 1990 to 2002 measured in fixed 
prices (Kleven og Mørk 2004), which is strongly positive for the airline industry. 
 
Inflation, consumption, unemployment and interest rates are all economic factors which are 
tied close together. All of them are important for the airline industry since a negative 
development in one of these key factors can lead to a change from consumption to saving. In 
a fluctuating market people are more restrictive with spending on luxury goods as mention 
above.  
 
In the airline industry fuel prices are a critical economic factor. Fuel prices are directly 
connected with growth in oil prices. The last years these expenses have been the main driver 
on the cost side. To make jet fuel costs more predictable, SAS hedges a percentage of 
expected fuel consumption. On one hand this makes economic planning easier. On the other 
hand hedging is costly when oil prices are stable and the different financial instruments are 
not exercised. As mention earlier, SAS hedges on average 50 % of expected fuel consumption 
(SAS Group 2009). Only within the last two years fuel expenses has risen from about 15% of 
AEA members’ total operating cost to 22.5% (AEA 2008). In a press release from April 2008, 
when the oil price was near its peak, SAS put emphasis on the challenge of high fuel costs and 
low yield (SAS Group 2008). This confirms how important oil prices are to the margins in the 
industry.  
 
A possible increase in taxation in the airline industry can lead to lower margins. Today 
Norway is the only country in the world that has both a carbon tax and a NOx tax on jet fuel. 
Since the European Parliament and some parts of the European Commission regard this as 
unsatisfactory the Commission has worked through the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) trying to induce a global carbon tax on jet fuel. Temporarily this kind of 
regulation hasn’t given any concrete result, but it constitutes a large threat to the business 
sector by a potential introduction (SAS Annual Report 2008). 
6.1.2 SAS’ competition market 
 
As described in the theory chapter competitive forces are vital for possible profits in any 
industry. In the airline sector a study of air traffic showed that ticket prices decreased on 
flights between cities where competition existed. As an example ticket prices on the distance 
Oslo– Bodø felt with about 30 % from 2003 to 2007 after Norwegian gave SAS competition. 
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In accordance to theory the offering of an identical product will transfer power to the 
customers and push prices downwards (Transport Økonomisk Institutt 2007).  
 
Within the past years a competition skew occurred in the Norwegian aviation market. In 2003 
the airline company Norwegian had a higher share of business travellers on distance where 
they competed with SAS for the first time. Today however SAS has relatively strengthened 
their position in the business segment on the expense of Norwegian and SAS is yet again 
regarded to be the businessman’s choice (Transport Økonomisk Institutt 2007). 
 
Despite of deregulations in the aviation industry high entry barriers still exists. Plans for large 
new airports in Europe do not exist at the moment and in any case it will take 10-15 years to 
complete this kind of project.  The existing airport’s lack of free slots11 makes it difficult for 
new airlines to enter the market. Therefore SAS’ competitors will most likely remain the 
same in near future (SAS Annual Report 2008). The question is whether different plans 
concerning possible further landing strips will become approved in the future. The 
management of Oslo Airport Gardermoen has for example made a proposition for a third 
landing strip to the Ministry of Transport. If this become approved the capacity will increase 
significantly. This can create an entry possibility for new airlines and in addition intensify 
competition to and from Norway’s by far largest airport (Oslo Lufthavn Gardermoen 2007).  
Oslo Airport Gardermoen opened as late as in 1998, but in 2008 the capacity was already 
overloaded.  
 
Air traffic control and airport service providers are mostly government controlled and are in a 
monopoly situation. This means they have nearly all the negotiation power. About BSEK 9.8 
was paid in total fees from costumers and airlines in 2007 (SAS Annual Report 2008). 
Especially the low cost airlines try to deal with this problem by using smaller airports outside 
the biggest cities. This way they both avoid the capacity problem at the larger airports and pay 
less user fees.  
 
SAS is struggling to keep their current market shares. Norwegian has now 43 % market share 
on key routes in Norway. The no-frills company captures an increasing part of domestic 
traffic as Figure 16 describes. Within the last year Norwegian has at the sacrifice of SAS 
                                                 
11
 takeoff and landing times 
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increased their share with 2 % (Norwegian 2009). This trend is also reflected by that the no-
frill companies have increased their share from 9 % in 2003 to 29 % in 2007 on flights from 
Norway to foreign countries. The growth is explained both by increased market share on 
exciting routes and expanded number of destinations (Transport Økonomisk Institutt 2007).  
 
Figure 16: Norwegian’s market share on key routes in Norway (Norwegian 2009) 
 
Worldwide economic expansion up to 2008 has resulted in high growth. The optimism is 
reflected in the number of ordered aircrafts. As an example Norwegian is investing in 42 new 
aircrafts and has in addition an option on 42 more. Increased air fleet indicates even harder 
rivalry in SAS’ home markets.  
6.1.3 Conclusion  
 
SAS operates in an industry which is highly affected by the environment. Incremental 
changes can lead to radical reductions in the possibility of gaining profits. The sector is 
characterised by strong rivalry which again transfer power to costumers. In addition potential 
profit is reduced since the negotiation power belongs to the suppliers. The external analysis of 
the industry indicates low profitability potential if the airline does not have the ability to 
handle quick changes and being precautious. To survive in this industry it is vital to get the 
maximum out of the utilized recourses.  
6.2 Internal analysis 
6.2.1 “KIKK”-Analysis of SAS 
 
As mentioned in the theory part efficiency, quality, innovation and customer responsiveness 
are all building blocks in creating a strategic advantage. In the following part these factors are 
presented together as they highly influence each other. 
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Figure 17: “KIKK”-analysis 
 
As a response to current internal challenges, intense competition and internal struggles SAS 
has decided on a new strategic direction for the Group. The new strategic approach is built on 
five pillars which are focus on the Nordic home market and business travellers, strengthened 
commercial offering and improved cost base, streamlined organization, customer oriented 
culture and strengthened capital structure.  
 
The ―Core SAS‖ strategy plan reduces the company’s geographical operation area. The new 
focus will be on the Nordic home market and in particular on business travellers. Since 
business travellers are the most profitable segment SAS wish to prioritise this group and 
provide the best service available. Business travellers are the most profitable group because 
they are the ones who usually buy the full price tickets with full flexibility. In 2006 about 60-
70 % of the SAS Group’s customers flew on business purpose (SAS Group Annual Report 
2007). Within the framework of Core SAS the Group has launched a concept where the aim is 
to minimize travel time and maximise perceived customers value. The concept also 
contributes to increased efficiency as unprofitable routes are being closed down. This will 
increase margins and release resources which can be rearranged to more profitable projects.  
 
To improve their competitiveness the SAS Group works continuously to develop and improve 
their business model to increase costumer value. There are many examples of innovations in 
recent years. Two of them are internet check-in and continuously improved online booking 
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with price calendars that shows when the best offers are available. In an attempt to increase 
their product portfolio SAS has introduced something they call ―economy extra‖ where 
passengers with an upgraded ticket get a ―free‖ meal and a drink during the flight. Another 
innovation is the introduction of fast track security control dedicated to business class 
passengers. Since many airports have large queues in front of the security check the fast track 
makes a great opportunity for business travellers to save time (SAS Annual Report 2008) . 
 
SAS also provides supplementary services such as in-flight shopping and travellers have the 
opportunity to book hotels and rent cars from their home page. These quality attributes are all 
supplementary services in an attempt to increase product value. 
 
6.2.2 Analysis of SAS’ resources 
 
For SAS it is of high importance to have resources that creates company value. In the 
following part an analysis of some of these resources are presented. 
  
A well-known and incorporated brand can create a large excess value for a company. 
According to the American Marketing Association, a brand is a ―name, term, sign, symbol, or 
design, or a combination of them, intended to identify the goods and services of one seller or 
group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of competition‖. A search for 
Scandinavian Airlines on Google results in over 1 million hits which indicate what a massive 
amount of media coverage this company gets. SAS has established a strong brand name and 
image, based on quality and safety.  
 
The SAS brand can be regarded as a competitive advantage, as the company’s competitors 
cannot easily copy this image. However the destruction of a strong brand is easier. SAS has 
experienced that single episodes such as the problems with Dash q400, can greatly damage 
the company’s image of safety and reliability. Ternert states that the company took the Dash 
Q400 aircrafts out of operation in order to maintain the company’s brand image (Hauger 
2007). This shows the managements awareness of the importance of keeping a strong brand.  
 
SAS benefits from being the historical flag carrier and as such a national symbol. At least in 
the past one could say that the feeling of national pride and belonging added to SAS’ brand 
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value. After SAS lost its monopoly the sense of national belonging has diminished. The first 
mover advantage is long gone and SAS struggles with the notion of being an old-fashioned, 
slow moving giant. Media has had a negative focus on the company in the last years, and SAS 
must work hard to gain renewed confidence in the market.  
 
The Scandinavian governments that control the majority of the SAS shares provide some 
financial security due to their financial strength and long term commitment. Supportive for 
this is the current rights issue which was accepted without any conflicts. Strong capital 
structure must be viewed as important because it makes a guarantee to SAS employees 
concerning the company’s ability to handle unforeseen changes and necessary adjustments. It 
is minimal probability that the owners will let SAS go bankrupt, and because of this we think 
SAS has a lowered credit risk. Financial security creates confidence that could lead to spin-off 
effects among employees concerning motivation and effort as again can form a competition 
advantage. The connection is illustrated in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 18: Financial strength as competitive advantage 
 
The workforce keeps the wheels rolling and is the fundamental pillar of any company. In SAS 
they constitute the public face, and are extremely vital with respect to the public’s 
interpretation of the company. Recently however this resource has been more of a liability. 
This can be supported by countless examples. One is SAS Norway’s disagreement with their 
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employees concerning pension terms that have result in both anger among employees and 
increased cost since the company lost in court (Klever 2008). Strike is unfortunately a 
frequently used policy instrument of different employee groups. Huge cost losses are the 
consequences because of cancelled flights and costumers turning their back on the company. 
Strike leads to a weakening of SAS’ reputation and brand and people lose their company trust. 
According to one of the most well reputed trade union leader satisfied employees leads to 
satisfied customers. As support for this he also refers to Norwegian’s CEO Bjørn Kjos 
statement in connection with the pilot strike in 2007 of how important it is to be a friend of 
your employee. Kjos even emphasises that this is more important than being friends with your 
costumers. 
 
It is no doubt that SAS’ employees are the most important intangible resource of SAS. SAS 
must work to improve communication with employees and ensure that there is motivation and 
a sense of belonging that induces the staff to work for the company rather than against it.  
SAS’ employees have benefited from excellent beneficial terms when it comes to salary, 
compensations and work hours. As the company now is in a period of change it is important 
that the employees are informed about the situation and that they get an explanation 
concerning why things are changing and why the changes are necessary for survival in 
today’s market.  
 
SAS most important tangible asset is their air fleet, which include about 10 different kinds of 
aircrafts. This constitutes an advantage since it enables SAS to serve different kind of routes, 
i.e. long haul, short haul and intercontinental. Norwegian, on the other hand, does not have 
this opportunity as their fleet consists of only one type of aircrafts. The variety in aircrafts can 
also be a challenge. Pilot must have dedicated training to operate a specific aircraft and 
therefore they cannot step in to operate any aircraft in the fleet if needed. It also increase 
maintains costs as they have to use different providers and thereby lose the benefits from 
economics of scale (Kjos 2009). A compound air fleet can be viewed both as a rare and 
important recourse. If SAS closest competitors in the future decide to position different, their 
aircraft composition will not constitute an advantage for the company.     
 
SAS’ large share of leased aircrafts provides high flexibility tied to changes in demand. In 
times of recession it is difficult to sell owned airplanes, but it is easy to not renew expired 
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leasing contracts. Leasing is easily copied by competitors and cannot be said to be a 
competitive advantage.  
 
SAS’ membership in Star Alliance constitutes a strategic advantage. Code sharing, where 
alliance members share aircrafts on given routes, provides an improved service offer and 
increased capacity utilization. At the end of 2008, 24 airlines were members of the Star 
Alliance. This membership also makes it possible for SAS to offer flights to their costumers 
they do not operate themselves (SAS Group Annual Report 2009). Compared to almost all of 
SAS’ closest competitors their membership in Star Alliance must be view as both rare and 
important. However other alliances do exist, e.g Skyteam, so SAS’ competitors do have the 
possibility to enter such alliances. However, membership in other alliances than Star Alliance 
does not imply equivalent advantages to these companies. Star Alliance is today the largest 
worldwide airline alliance and in the end the value of being a member in an alliance depends 
upon the strength of the other members. Some of the current members are Lufthansa, Air 
China, South African Airlines, US Airways and Air Canada.  
 
6.2.3 Conclusion 
 
Efficiency, quality, innovation and costumer response are all tied close together. It is clear 
that SAS must be adaptable and precautious in order to survive. Through increased focus on 
business travellers SAS will strengthen their position in the market. It seems like a good move 
to have a more differentiated strategy.  
 
SAS holds valuable recourses and some can be classified as competitive advantages that their 
competitors cannot easily copy. SAS’ biggest problem is their bad utilization of employees. 
Since SAS employees have a huge influence on the company’s other recourses it is even more 
important. It is clear that some changes must be done in this area if SAS shall survive and 
operate profitable in the future.   
 
6.3 Summary of the strategic analysis of SAS in a SWOT-analysis 
 
A comparison of a company’s strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats is often referred 
to as a SWOT-analysis. Its aim is to identify a strategic adjustment that will create a 
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company-specific business model that best will align, fit or match a company’s recourses and 
capabilities adjusted to the environment it operates within (Hill and Jones 2008). 
 
In the previous strategic presentation different reasons whether SAS’ has or has not the 
potential to gain competition advantage was presented. This is summarized in the SWOT- 
analysis below.  
 
 
Figure 19: SWOT-analysis 
 
To obtain sustainable profitability SAS is strongly dependent on maximising the utilization of 
its recourses and implement a strategy that supports it. The company has from now on, 
according to its Core SAS strategy, intentions of focusing even more on business travellers 
and its home market. This is a good move since it is the company’s most profitable segment. 
By differentiate towards this segment the company gets a clearer position in the market 
instead of unsuccessful trying to reach all groups. SAS cannot compete with low cost 
companies on price and should rather focus on product quality. By doing this well, SAS can 
get a sustainable competitive advantage by being the number one choice among the most 
profitable costumers.  
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7 Operating forecast 
 
In this chapter we will summarize what the industry and SAS think about the future and make 
our own EBITDAR predictions based on that and the previous presented information.  
7.1 Industry forecast 
 
 
Figure 20: Forecasts for global GDP growth (IATA 2008) 
Statistical evidence shows that GDP or income elasticity is high while price sensitivity is low 
in the aviation sector. Economic growth is the principle driver of the market, and today’s 
recession is extremely bad news for market prospects.  
 
The mainstream opinion among economists in late 2008 was persisting economic growth. The 
three major economies of USA, Europe and Japan where expected to grow with respectively 
0.5 %, 1.5 % and 1.5 %. As the figure above describes the forecast is now changed to negative 
growth for all of them. An even worse slowdown in growth is expected in previously robust 
emerging markets as for instance China and India. For the entire world the economic growth 
forecast is reduced from 2.6 % to 0.9 %. This is worse than both the recession in 1991 and 
during the downturn in 2001. The connection between GDP and passenger development over 
the last decades is illustrated below.  
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Figure 21: GDP and passenger growth (IATA 2008) 
 
As a result of the recession US Airlines cut both domestic and international capacity in an 
attempt to reduce losses. This approach to save money is not as obvious in other parts of the 
world. In Europe fear of losing slots at congested airports makes airlines hesitate, while a 
large number of new ordered aircrafts must take the blame in Asia and Middle East. If 
forecast are correct, the result will be reduced load factors because of faster falling traffic than 
available seats, which again will lead to downward pressure on yield and profitability. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Predicted revenue and fuel cost reduction (IATA 2008) 
 
Within the last 4 years oil expenses has been 20-30 % of the aviation industry’s total cost. The 
graph below describes the oil price development from 2003 until today. Profitability in the 
airline sector is strongly dependent on development in fuel prices. In 2008 the price on jet fuel 
rose from $ 90 per barrel in January to peak at $ 180 per barrel in July. The result for the 
industry was an increased fuel cost of $ 38 billion. In an attempt to neutralize price increases 
many companies have hedged a part of their oil consumption a year ahead. Because of a more 
drastic price bubble than consensus analysts have thought the spot and future prices in 
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December 08 where respectively $60 and $50 below 4 months earlier forecasts. This 
illustrates that hedging can both be an advantage and a disadvantage. The figure below shows 
that reduction in fuel price almost offset loss as a consequence of reduced capacity in 2009.  
 
 
Figure 23: Oil price forecast (IATA 2008) 
 
The current recession also affects passenger and air freight markets negatively. As world trade 
decreased, the air freight was reduced by almost 8 % in October 2008. As a consequence of 
increased unemployment and decreased average wealth the passenger market also went down 
2 % the same month. Further absolute falls in both passenger and freights markets are 
expected. The figure shows the development in mentioned factors over the last three years. 
 
Figure 24: Traffic volume forecast (IATA 2008) 
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7.2 SAS’ forecast 
 
In this part we will look at what SAS is saying about the future themselves. With the new 
strategy plan (Core SAS) there are some major changes that need to be accounted for in our 
forecasts. SAS states that they in total will reduce cost with BSEK 4. 
 
  SAS Group 2008* Core SAS 
Operating revenue BSEK 63  BSEK 48  
Adjusted net debt BSEK 29  BSEK 14 
Employees 23400 14600 
Aircraft fleet 298 217 
Passengers 40 million 28 million 
Routes 200 124 
Earnings effects   BSEK 7  
*Including Spanair 
Table 8: Effects of Core SAS strategy plan (SAS Group Annual Report 2009) 
 
Of the intended 4 billion cost reduction, 1.3 billion comprise savings from collective 
agreements. SAS has for many years been troubled with strong employee unions which have 
in the past negotiated agreements that are far better than their colleges in competitive airlines. 
This has contributed to creating a negative cost gap between SAS and their nearest rivals. But 
in January 2009 there was a breakthrough concerning all of the 39 unions. New agreements 
for pilots, cabin crew and ground staff were signed (SAS Group Annual Report 2009).  
 
Cost program 2009-2011 
MSEK Earnings effect 
Flight operations ~300 
Ground ~300 
Technical maintenance ~200 
Outsourcing ~200 
Purchasing ~500 
Reorganization ~400 
Sales & administration ~500 
Other  ~300 
Total ~2700 
Table 9: Breakdown of cost savings from Core SAS  (SAS Group Annual Report 2009) 
 
The remaining 2.7 billion will come from a new cost saving program. Of this over half of the 
earnings impact will occur in 2009. Of the remaining the majority will occur in 2010 and the 
rest in 2011.  The cost measures include savings in all operational areas with the most 
extensive effect in sales and administration, purchasing and effects of the reorganization. The 
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total cost that is estimated to accrue in relation with the implementation of the Core SAS 
strategy is about BSEK 1.  
 
Together with the cost reductions unprofitable routes will be closed down. SAS will reduce 
their capacity by about 20 %. This means that about 26 planes will be taken out of operation. 
Based on the income of 2008 SAS believes that this would have made up a positive income 
improvement of SEK 0.8 billion. SAS will also sell their shares in companies outside the 
Nordic countries. None of these companies are consolidated and will only have a minor 
income effect. It is also stated that the company might outsource more of its ground service 
operations. This business unit has already been up for discussion and was nearly sold in 2008 
because of unprofitability (Haugedal 2008). However it was kept under the premises of a cost 
reduction of BSEK 0.4 within one and a half year. If this is not accomplished we believe this 
business unit will be sold.  
 
SAS’ long term target is an EBT-margin of at least 7 %. For this to happen they need a 
positive result of about BSEK 3.5 based on a revenue of 50 billion (SAS information folder, 
2009). The debt ratio target is less than 100 %.  
 
SAS has stated that they will cut their capacity by 17 percent in accordance to the new Core 
SAS strategy. At the same time passenger numbers are predicted to decline in 2009 due to the 
international banking crisis. IATA estimated in December last year that the passenger 
numbers would decrease by 3 % in 2009 and revenue by 6 %. The first passenger numbers 
available from 2009 shows that the industry so far is doing worse than predicted. The same 
agency is reporting that the revenue passenger kilometers (RPK) has fallen by nearly 8% 
during the first two months of 2009 compared to the same period last year. The available seat 
kilometers (ASK), which measures capacity, is reduced by about 4 %. In other words the 
number of passengers is decreasing faster than then capacity which will reduce profitability. 
Table 10 presents the latest passenger numbers from SAS which shows a significant drop in 
passenger numbers. Even though the capacity have been reduced by 13 % compared to 
November last year the RPK has dropped even further with 20 %. This has reduced the load 
factor which again means a less effective use of the assets employed. 
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   Januar Februar 
Business area RPK ASK RPK ASK 
Intercontinental 90 % 103 % 80 % 93 % 
Europe 85 % 86 % 81 % 87 % 
Intrascandinavia 87 % 89 % 80 % 85 % 
Denmark 88 % 92 % 86 % 90 % 
Norway 77 % 82 % 79 % 85 % 
Sweden 76 % 74 % 74 % 71 % 
SAS Group 85 % 90 % 80 % 87 % 
Table 10: SAS’ traffic development for the first two months of 2009 in % of last year (SAS Group 2009) 
7.3. EBITDAR forecast 
 
For the EBITDAR and cash flow forecast we have chosen to use ten years for our explicit 
period and year 11 is used to calculate the continuing value after year 10. This we believe is 
sufficient time for implementing the information available and for the company to reach 
steady state.     
 
The most important and difficult factor in our forecast is the future passenger revenue. 
Passenger revenue is not only dependent on the number of passengers that choose to fly with 
SAS, but also what the passengers pay for their tickets. Business travelers usually fly on full 
price tickets while leisure travelers usually go after the lowest fares available. 
 
We believe that the current economic recession will reverse sometime in the end of 2009 and 
that the traffic will drop 5-10% in Scandinavia compared to last year. Based on these 
assumptions and the facts discussed in 7.1, we estimate the passenger traffic for SAS to drop 
by 25%. Of this15-20% is related to capacity reduction and the remains as a result of the 
current recession (Appendix figure 3). We have put the passenger decline in direct 
relationship with the revenue and reduced it by the same amount. This because we believe 
that there will be no dramatic changes in costumer mixture which already is in large part 
business customers. In 2010 however we expect an increase in passenger traffic as the 
recession is believed to be over its peak and we estimate a passenger growth of 5%. Low 
interest rates and increased government spending due to the financial crisis should have 
positive effects for the economy for several years. Therefore we also believe in a higher 
growth for 2011 and have set it to 5% as well. We do not believe that the flight transport 
industry in Scandinavia will grow significantly after the rebound effect of the recession. The 
passenger market is relatively mature and the competition is intense. SAS is also struggling to 
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keep its current market share in competition with low fare companies and the population 
growth in Scandinavia, and thereby the market size, is small. Therefore we use a cautious 
estimate from 2012 of 2.5%. This is equivalent to the average inflation in the Scandinavian 
market for the last 20 years (Appendix figure 1). In other words we believe that improved 
margins must be made through improved cost efficiency and product quality rather than 
passenger growth. With our prognosis SAS will reach their goal of carrying 28 mill 
passengers in five years time. From the strategically analysis we think this is realistic as the 
company is the number one choice for business travelers and still has a strong brand. 
  
Income from charter operations has dropped in recent years and therefore the average 
percentage of passenger revenues from only the last three years have been used. Revenue 
from Cargo and mail has decreased continuously so the future estimates are based on last 
year’s percentage of passenger revenue. Other traffic revenue is based on the percentage 
average for the whole historic period as it has been quite unstable. Other operational income 
have continued to grow for the last for years after dropping by 16% from 2004 to 2005, the 
average from the four last years have therefore been used. The above mentioned operating 
incomes grow proportional to the passenger growth in our forecast period.   
 
The expenditures are mostly variable and are therefore set to a percentage of total revenue 
using the techniques described above (Appendix figure 4). But some of the items have been 
adjusted to take the new Core SAS strategy into account. Handling costs and maintenance will 
be reduced by accordingly 300 and 200 MSEK. Here we have found what percentage this 
would have made up in 2008 and used the new number in our forecast .The remaining 2.2 
billion of the cost reduction program is deducted from the post ―other expenses‖.  
 
Jet fuel is an important and difficult expense to forecast. Although it has been unreasonable 
high the last years we also think that the average jet fuel cost of 12.3 percent of revenue is too 
small for the future. The lack of large new oil findings and increased demand for oil are 
arguments for a higher oil price then what we have seen historically. We have therefore put 
the oil price at 15 % of revenue which is between last year’s high expenses of 18.1% and the 
historical average of 12.3 %. 
 
Contrary to the other expenses we look at payroll expenses as a fixed cost in the short to 
medium run. The new collective union agreements will lower the percentage of payroll 
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expenses to revenue from 36 to 32% relative to the 2008 level. Laying off people is never 
easy, especially in a company with historically strong unions. It is therefore difficult to adjust 
the number of employees to the activity level of the company. We believe that it will take 
some time to adjust the cost level of wages and that employees will not leave the company 
without a fight. But SAS has to reduce these expenses if they want to be able to compete in 
the Nordic market. It also looks like the unions to some degree have understood this recently. 
We therefore believe that cost reductions are possible, but that it will take several years and 
battles to reach the desired cost level. In our forecast we have projected that SAS will use five 
years to adjust the number of employees to the new and reduced activity level and for the cost 
reduction program to be fully implemented. In 2013 we have set the wage level to 32% as 
SAS has targeted and then the difference between the 2008 and 2013 level is reduced by equal 
amounts over the five years (-735 millions). 
 
In our forecast we have not tried to include any future business cycles as they are impossible 
to predict. However the current recession is accounted for with a negative impact in 2009 and 
a rebound effect the following two years. The growth after this must be seen as a predicted 
average growth and not as actual accounting numbers for the respectively years as the 
aviation industry is turbulent and full of ups and downs. 
 
 We do believe that there is potential in SAS and that the new strategy plan and rights issue 
will point the company in the right direction. From 2001-2008 the average operational margin 
(EBITDAR margin) was about 8.5 % where 5 of 8 years gave negative result. With our 
projections the operational margin will improve to nearly 16 % in five years time. This should 
not be unrealistic after the implementation of the new strategy as the margin was 10-11 % in 
four of the last eight years. 
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 8 Valuation of SAS 
 
In this chapter we will estimate the cost of capital and present what we believe is a fair value 
for a SAS share.  
8.1 SAS’ cost of capital 
 
The ingredients in an analysis of SAS’ cost of capital are risk-free rate, market premium, 
company beta, debt rate and equity and debt market values. In the following part these 
components are calculated to estimate the average cost of capital for SAS.   
8.1.1 Risk-free rate 
 
Both short and long term government bonds can be used to find a measure for the risk-free 
rate. A common understanding among economists is that ―normal‖ real interest rate is equal to 
the long term real growth in GNP (Johnsen 2006). In the period from 1990 until 2008 the 
growth was 2.2 % in Sweden (Appendix figure 2). This is in accordance to the average real 
rate of 2.0 % over the last 105 years. An average inflation of 2.5 % within the mentioned 18 
years time period argues for a ―risk free‖ nominal long term rate of 4.7 % (Appendix figure 
1). 
 
Since the past do not necessarily equal the future we have used a different approach. We have 
used a Swedish government bond with ten years maturity and a coupon of 4.25 % (NASDAQ 
OMX NORDIC 2009). This bond is forward looking and reflects the market’s expectations of 
future interest rates rather than the historical ones. Since our cash flows are calculated after 
tax it is also necessary to adjust the interest rate to get them comparable. The risk-free rate 
after tax is 3.2%
12
. 
8.1.2 Beta estimation 
 
For listed companies the equity beta can be estimated based on historical data. Using daily 
observations of the share price and the Stockholm all share index (OMXS) we have estimated 
SAS’ beta value. The beta value is highly dependent on the time span used in the calculation. 
From Table 11 below we can see that the share price fluctuated less compared to the market 
index in the early years of the current decade than it does today. We believe that the early 
years of this decade is not representative for a calculation of future beta because of the lack of 
                                                 
12
 4.25 % * (1-0.25) = 3.19 (the effective calculated tax rate for the company is 25 %) 
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competition and a different company structure. At the same time the last year might have been 
extra volatile because of the difficulties the airline industry, and in particular SAS, is facing as 
a result of the current recession. We have therefore chosen to use a medium range in our beta 
calculation using the last five years (2004-2008). This gives us a beta estimate of 1.18 
(Appendix figure 8)  
 
Period Β 
2001-2005 0,72 
2001-2008 1,00 
2004-2008 1,18 
2008 1,32 
Table 11: Beta estimations within different time spans 
A beta of 1.18 indicates that the share price fluctuates more than the market index and thereby 
has a relative high business risk.  
8.1.3 Risk premium 
 
An influential academic paper on global equity risk premiums concludes with an arithmetic 
average risk premium of 7.1 % for the Swedish stock market based on historical data from 
1900-2001 (Dimson, Marsh and Stauton 2002). A similar study done by Thore Johnsen 
concludes with a premium of 7.6 % using date from 1900-2004 (Johnsen 2006). 
 
It is highly discussable if the historical risk premiums are representative for the future. Huge 
technological improvements and high inflation trough the 20
th
 century are factors that could 
make the calculated historical risk premium of 7.1 % higher then what we can expect for the 
future. But history has a tendency to repeat itself. There is no insurance against high future 
inflation and the technological development is still going relatively fast. The awakening of the 
East-Asian economies is also a potential reason for a consistent high risk premium. Because 
of the uncertainty we have choose to use the historical estimate of 7.1 %.  
 
In the following calculation we need a nominal tax adjusted risk premium. To obtain this we 
need to add the risk free rate before tax, and then subtract the rate after tax. This gives us a 
risk premium of 8.15 %
13
. 
                                                 
13
 (7.1 % + 4.25 %) – 3.2 % = 8.15 % 
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8.1.4 Cost of equity 
 
We calculate the cost of equity by using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). From the 
equation below we see that the estimated nominal after tax cost of equity is 12.82 %. 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑗 ) = 𝑅𝑓 + (𝐸 𝑅𝑚  − 𝑅𝑓)𝛽𝑗  = 3.2 % + (8.15 %) * 1.18= 12.82 % 
8.1.5 SAS’ debt and equity ratio 
 
  Mill. SEK Percent 
Adjusted financial net debt:     
Leasing (cost(x7))* 13 897 35,3 % 
Interest-bearing liabilities 12 542 31,8 % 
     
Equity market value** 12 954 32,9 % 
Total liabilities and equity 39 393 100,0 % 
* Adjusted for reduced number of leased fights 
** Ass of 07.04.2009 
Table 12: SAS’ enterprise market value 
The table above display how SAS’ enterprise value is split between equity and debt. A total of 
67.1% and 32.9 % are respectively debt and equity. In an attempt to get a more representative 
ratio for the future, interest-bearing liabilities has been reduced by the amount collected from 
the equity issue less forecasted financial deficit for 2009 and 2010
14
.   
8.1.6 SAS’ cost of debt 
 
Accordingly to Table 13 below SAS’ average interest expenditures are 6.34 %. Interest 
expenditures are influenced by floating interest rates and foreign exchange rates and are 
therefore volatile. An alternatively approximation is to use the company’s credit rating. B 
rated companies are estimated to have an interest cost of 200 % of risk-free rate (Kinserdal 
2008). According to this SAS’ debt rate would currently have been 8.48 %. However this is a 
roughly estimation and varies a lot from company to company. SAS’ future credit rating is 
also difficult to predict. We have therefore chosen to use the average debt rate on 6.34 %. The 
debt rate adjusted for tax is 4.76 %
15
. 
  
                                                 
14
 16 117-6 000+1782+643 =12 542 
15
 6.34 % * (1 – 0.25) = 4.76 % 
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  2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 Average 
Interest expenditures 956 1 083 1 519 1 408 1 233 1 906 1 979 897 1 373 
Interest-bearing liabilities 16 117 12 042 16 478 26 337 27 280 28 866 29 782 26 124 22 878 
Interest rate in % 5,93 % 8,99 % 9,22 % 5,35 % 4,52 % 6,60 % 6,64 % 3,43 % 6,34 % 
Table 13: SAS’ historical interest expenditures 
 
8.1.7 SAS’ cost of capital 
 
SAS’ total cost of capital is the weighted average cost. The calculation is presented in the 
equation below.  
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝐸
𝑉
∗ 𝑅𝐸 +
𝐷
𝑉
∗ 𝑅𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝐶) = (12 954 / 39 393) * 12.82 % +   
  ((13 897/ 39 393)*(10.3 %* 0.75)) + (12 542 / 39 393)* 4.76 % = 8.46 % 
 
SAS’ nominal tax adjusted cost of capital is estimated to be 8.46 %. Since the rental cost on 
the leased airplanes is estimated to be 10.3 %, and the leasing was kept out of the calculation 
of average interest expenditure of 6.34 %, the two debt equivalents were included separately 
in the WACC calculation. 
 
8.2 Cash flow value for explicit period 
  
To obtain the predicted free cash flows we have adjust the EBITDAR we found in chapter 7 
with the factors mentioned below:   
8.2.1 Net working capital  
 
Working capital binds up cash in the company and any changes will affect the cash flow. A 
buffer or reserve of cash is needed in any firm to be able to meet the short time obligations to 
creditors. In SAS’ case they are also stating that they need a buffer to meet challenges and 
cover deficits in difficult financial times. Therefore they have set a goal to reach a financial 
preparedness of 20 % of revenue in cash equivalent assets (SAS Group 2009). Last year’s 
working capital was 8.2 % of revenue and the average for the last eight years is 11 % 
(Appendix figure 12). We think that the target of reaching a financial preparedness of 20 % 
therefore is a long term project and we have gradually increased the percentage from 2008 
level to reach the target of 20 % in 2019.  
69 
 
8.2.2 Normalized investments 
 
We need to find a reasonable estimate for the investments needed to upkeep a certain level of 
assets relative to a given activity level. Ideally we would have used historical net investments 
from the company’s cash flow statement, but this proved to be impossible since the 
information given was inadequate. Cash flow from sale of aircrafts, buildings and shares were 
all reported on the same line and the reporting was not consistent. Therefore we have used a 
different approach. We have estimated the average depreciation relative to the revenue over 
the last 13 years. As many years as possible is used because the depreciation will be higher 
right after large purchases of new airplanes which makes the depreciation a bit volatile. After 
removing the implicit interest part from the leasing cost we also get an estimated depreciation 
part from leasing activities. This is added to the reported depreciation. This way we also avoid 
any problems with changing ratio between leased and owned airplanes in the future.   
 
SAS has estimated that about 10 % of the aircraft value is intact after the aircraft is fully 
written off (SAS Group Annual Report 2009). Therefore we have deducted 10 % from the 
average depreciation. The reason for this is that SAS will get a positive cash flow when they 
sell the aircraft and therefore the net investments will be less than the accounted depreciation. 
In other words the aircrafts are depreciated over a time span that is too short which makes the 
yearly cost too high.  
 
The average depreciation is estimated to 5.35 % of revenue and adjusted with -10 % it gives 
us an estimate of 4.8 % (Appendix figure 13). It is not ideal to calculate depreciation as a 
percentage of revenue, but this way the depreciation follows the activity level and thereby the 
assets employed. We could have rather calculated the future size of the air-fleet and used a 
percentage of assets, but this is to complex as a firm outsider. 
8.2.3 Tax and restructuring costs 
 
We cannot use historical data to estimate an effective tax rate since the company has basically 
not earned any money the last eight years and of course not paid any significant taxes. 
Therefore we have to look at nominal rates. Norway and Sweden have a nominal tax rate of 
respectively 28 and 26.3 %. Denmark has 25 % and Finland 26 % (OECD 2009). On one 
hand Norway is the country where SAS makes the most revenue and more emphasis should 
be put on this relative higher tax rate. But on the other hand the effective tax rate is usual 
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lower than the nominal for companies with heavy depreciation. When we calculated the 
average depreciation we also showed that this might be true since the write offs are done on a 
too short time span (20 years) which reduces payable taxes. Another point is that SAS most 
likely also will have negative result in difficult years in the future, which will reduce the tax 
in profitable years.  Therefore we have decided to use an effective tax rate of 25 %. This is 
also the average calculated effective tax rate for Norwegian companies (Kinserdal 2008). 
Even this tax rate might be too high but it is our best guess. 
 
In the 2008 annual report (note 10) we find that SAS has a deferred tax asset of MSEK 968 
after previous year’s deficits. This amount equals what is believed to be legally deductable 
before the right to use loss carryforwards is expired. This is together with the predicted 
deficits of 2009-2010 subtracted from the future estimated surplus which reduces tax 
significantly in 2011-2012. 
 
The restructuring cost in relation to implementation of the Core SAS strategy plan is by SAS 
estimated to be BSEK 1. SAS has only stated that the majority of this cost will accrue in 
2009, but not how much. We have therefore deducted the cash flow with 600 million in 2009, 
300 in 2010 and 100 in 2011. 
 
8.2.4 Discounted cash flows 
 
To obtain the NPV of the cash flows after tax they are divided by (1+WACC)^
N  
where N 
represents the year the cash flow is earned. This way the yearly cash flows becomes 
comparable and we can summarize them to get the NPV of the cash flows for the first 10 
years which sums up to BSEK 12.4 (year 11 is included in the continuing value).  You can see 
the results below in Table 14. 
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(MSEK) 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 
EBITDAR -197 2137 4587 5840 7102 7280 7462 7648 7840 8036 8236 
EBITDAR margin -1 % 5 % 11 % 13 % 16 % 16 % 16 % 16 % 16 % 16 % 16 % 
Net working capital 3632 4252 4925 5521 6143 6792 7471 8179 8918 9688 10492 
% of operating profit 9,3 % 10,4 % 11,4 % 12,5 % 13,6 % 14,7 % 15,7 % 16,8 % 17,9 % 18,9 % 20,0 % 
Change in working capital -745 620 673 595 622 650 678 708 739 771 803 
Depreciation 1874 1968 2067 2118 2171 2226 2281 2338 2397 2457 2518 
% of operating profit 4,8 % 4,8 % 4,8 % 4,8 % 4,8 % 4,8 % 4,8 % 4,8 % 4,8 % 4,8 % 4,8 % 
Core SAS expenditures 600 300 100                 
Gross profit -1926 -752 1747 3127 4309 4405 4502 4602 4704 4808 4915 
EBT margin -4,9 % -1,8 % 4,1 % 7,1 % 9,5 % 9,5 % 9,5 % 9,4 % 9,4 % 9,4 % 9,4 % 
Deffered tax assets -2894 -3646 -1899 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taxable income 0 0 0 1228 4309 4405 4502 4602 4704 4808 4915 
25% tax 0 0 0 307 1077 1101 1126 1151 1176 1202 1229 
After tax cash flow -1926 -752 1747 2820 3232 3303 3377 3452 3528 3606 3686 
NPV -1776 -639 1369 2038 2153 2201 1913 1802 1699 1601 1509 
Table 14: Forecasted NPV of cash flows for 2009-2019. 
 
8.3 Continuing period 
 
After the company has reached what we have called steady state there is no need to make 
explicit cash flow forecasts. When the value drivers are believed to be at constant ratios we 
can use Gordon’s formula to estimate the continuing value after the explicit period. Gordon’s 
formula is given by: 
 
 
𝑉𝑛 =
𝐶𝐹𝑛+1
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
Formula (6) 
where: 
𝑉𝑛 =  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑛  
𝐶𝐹𝑛+1 = 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑛 + 1 
𝑔 = 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕 
 
With this formula it is implied that the cash flow grows with a constant ratio of 𝑔 at all 
eternity. We therefore have to be careful when setting the growth factor because it will have 
major impact on the company value. Practitioners often puts this factor equal the inflation or 
the average GDP growth. We have chosen set 𝑔 at 2 % as have been the average inflation in 
the Nordic countries over the last 10 years. At the same time the average GDP growth of 
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Sweden was 2.2 % over the last 20 years (Appendix figure 2). Inserted in the equation 
together with the estimated cash flow for year 11 this gives: 
 
𝑉10 =
3 686
8.46 % − 2.0 %
= 57 062 => 𝑉0 =
57 062
(1 + 8.46 %)^10
= 25 331 
 
The NPV value of SAS cash flow from 2019 and forward is estimated to be BSEK 25.3. 
8.4 Share value 
 
When we add the explicit and continuing value together we get what is called enterprise value 
which is basically the after tax present value of all future cash flows. But what we want to 
find is the equity value so we have to deduct the enterprise value with the company’s net debt. 
The adjusted net debt was by the end of 2008 about BSEK 29.7. But company has in the 
beginning of 2009 brought in new equity of BSEK 6 so we have to add this to the equation. 
This gives us an equity value of BSEK 14 which means that one SAS share could be worth 
SEK 5.67 if our assumptions are correct. 
 
SAS valuation 
Explicit period value 12361 
Continuing value 25331 
Enterprise value 37692 
 - Adjusted net debt 29690 
Cash from issue 6000 
EQ value 14002 
Number of shares 2468 
Price per share 5,67 
Table 15: SAS valuation 
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9 Validity 
 
In this chapter we have a critical look at our fundamental valuation to see if the results are 
reasonable. We will use a different valuation technique and look at the market price and 
enlighten sources of error. 
9. 1 Peer review 
 
Multiple analysis is very popular among professionals because it supposedly is time saving 
and gives acceptable results. But to employ a multiple analysis correctly much of the same 
work has to be done as in the discounted cash flow method. This is because multiples also 
should be forward looking to get the most accurate result (McKinsey & Company 2005). 
Since multiples do not account for differences in potential growth and capital structure it is 
also important that the companies used to form your multiple is as similar to the company you 
want to value as possible when it comes to size, potential and other fundamentals. 
  
As explained in chapter 3.1.2 a preferred multiple is the EV/EBITA. But again because of the 
leasing issues we have adjusted this multiple slightly. The multiple we will be using is 
therefore the EV/EBITDAR. To obtain the multiple we have used the average of three 
different companies. Those are Finnair (Finland), Iberia (Spain) and Austrian Airlines. What 
they all have in common with SAS are that they are flag carriers of their home nations and 
are, or have been, state controlled to some degree. They are all also European operators of 
medium size and should therefore have about the same growth opportunities and economic 
premises.  
 
When we apply the EV/EBITDAR for three peer companies we get an average ratio of 6.26. 
But the company ratios range from 4.57 to 7.43 which show that there must be significant 
differences in future growth expectation and/or capital cost (Appendix figure 9-11). When 
applied on SAS the multiple of 6.26 gives a share value of SEK -1.36 when we use last year’s 
EBITDAR. But as we discussed earlier the multiple should be forward looking. SAS is going 
through major restructuring compared to the other companies and therefore their financial 
improvements should be potentially greater than in the other peer companies. We have 
therefore looked at what the value per share would have been if the EBITDAR for 2008 was 
as if the company had gone through a successful restructuring process. Using the EBITDAR 
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we have predicted for 2013 and discounting it with the expected inflation to get it comparable 
to 2008 money we get a share price of SEK 5.70.  
 
 
  2008 Based on 2013 
EV/EBITDAR average ratio 6.26   
SAS EBITDAR 3 251 6 433 
SAS adjusted net debt 23 690 26 190 
EV 20 342 40 250 
Number of shares 2 468 2 468 
Implisti equity value -3 348 14 060 
Share value -1.36 5.70 
Table 16: SAS’ value by multiple analysis. 
The net debt in 2008 is adjusted for the BSEK 6.0 from the rights issue while it is higher in 
2013 as the excepted deficit has been accounted for. The share value of SEK 5.70 is nearly the 
same of what we found in the discounted cash flow method where we have a share price of 
SEK 5.67. When using the EBITDAR in the multiple all the figures below this point in the 
discounted cash flow analysis is not accounted for. This includes capital expenditures, change 
in work capital, taxes and capital cost. So what this peer review analysis indicates is that we 
cannot have missed totally on these figures since the two methods gave almost the same 
values.  
9.2 Sensitivity analysis 
 
In our forecast of SAS’ results for coming years we have tried to be as realistic as possible in 
an attempt to reflect the shares underlying fundamental value. Despite of this, a high degree of 
uncertainty exists as a consequence of extensive use of judgment and approximations.  To 
highlight how robust and sensitive our calculation are to changes in important inputs we 
present a sensitivity analysis. 
 
The most important factors to examine are the large and most unpredictable value drives. Jet 
fuel and payroll expenses are two factors in this category which will be under the scope. On 
the income side passenger revenue is the most important input we look at. In addition we have 
chosen to examine how changes in the cost of capital and growth influence SAS share price. 
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Figure 25: Share price sensitivity to changes in jet fuel costs (%) 
 
A change in jet fuel costs of +/- 5 % implies a change in SAS’ share price of 26.5 %. This 
confirms the importance of this factor to the industry’s profitability and valuation, at least in 
the short run as all other variables are held constant.      
 
 
 
Figure 26: Share price sensitivity to changes in payroll expenses (%) 
 
As the graph above shows, SAS’ share price is more sensitive to changes in payroll expenses 
than it is to jet fuel costs. Changes of +/- 1 % result in a 35.5 % change in SAS’ share price. 
This change is larger than a 5 % change in jet fuel costs. By a 5 % decrease or increase in 
payroll expenses the share price will change with 177 %. This shows how important it will be 
for the company to reduce their payroll expenses. 
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5
S
h
a
re
 p
ri
c
e
%
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5
S
h
a
re
 p
ri
c
e
%
76 
 
 
Figure 27: Share price sensitivity to changes in passenger revenues (%) 
 
On the income side passenger revenue is the key source of income creation. Changes of +/- 5 
% make the share price go up or down with about 20%.  
 
 
Figure 28: Share price sensitivity to changes in growth rate (%) 
Growth assumptions are crucial in proportion to many inputs in our analysis. Only a small 
changed of -1 % makes the share price drop by almost 19.5 %. With an increase of 1 % the 
share price changes with as much as 47 %. The graph shows that an increase in growth has 
larger influence on share price than an equivalent decrease. Changes of +/- 2 % in growth 
result in almost a 78 % increase or a 42.5 % decrease in share value. This confirms the 
importance of neutrality when choosing growth rate in a valuation.   
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Figure 29: Share price sensitivity to changes in WACC (%) 
 
The cost of capital is calculated based on several inputs such as risk free rate, market 
premium, beta, and debt rate. This makes the WACC vulnerable to changes. A decrease in 
WACC leads to a larger change in SAS’ share price than an equal increase. If WACC is 
reduced to 7.5 % or increased to 9.5 % the share price is respectively changed by -57 % and 
45%. It is clear that the share price also is highly sensitive to change in WACC. 
9.3 Results compared to market value 
 
The market price of one SAS share was at the end of Friday the first of May on SEK 3.78. 
With this pricing the share has lost 40 % of its value so far this year. The share has been quite 
volatile and has been as high as 5.70 at some point during the first three months of 2009. But 
still with our price target of SEK 5.67 we are above the average market price for 2009. Right 
now the SAS share looks like a good investment in the long run with our target price that is 
about 33 % higher than the market value. However we have shown that SAS has some heavy 
debt and there is questionable if SAS will succeed with their Core SAS strategy plan. 
 
One factor we have not taken into account has arisen in the recent weeks. The so called 
swine-flu could be of great threat to the travel industry if the outbreak becomes severe. The 
market might have priced this into the share to some degree already. Another question is if 
there is a discounted on the SAS share because the company is owned by the Scandinavian 
governments. The market is in general skeptical to state controlled businesses as their level of 
freedom often are reduced. The large share ratio held by the governments also reduces the 
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trading volume which in theory also should reduce the share value (McKinsey & Company 
2005).   
9.4 Government ownership  
 
There are many other reasons than economical ones for a government to take ownership in a 
company like SAS. The main reasons for government ownership in national companies are 
control over natural resources, protect own political interests, upkeep the company’s national 
anchoring and prevent foreign control. 
 
National anchoring is important to keep expertise and important key functions at home. 
Another important task is to secure a well functional national infrastructure. This includes 
roads, railways, airports and power grids (Ministry of trade and industry 2008). Implied here 
is also a well functioning national air transport network.  
 
The major Norwegian political parties have strong disagreements when it comes to the 
principal of whether or not there should be government ownership in commercial companies. 
But on the vote for participating in the SAS rights issue there was only one party that voted 
against which was FRP. KrF however stated that participation was the best way to secure the 
share value. It would be positive for securing the government’s share values in times of 
financial distress and prevent negative consequences for both the functions of the company 
and its employees. KrF also made a point of the importance of responsible government 
ownership politics in times of recession. On the other side KrF expressed concern over 
government support for one specific company in a free market (Vatnar 2009). 
 
Among the Department of Transport’s most important tasks are to make sure that the air 
transport service is acceptable and well organised throughout the country. This is important in 
a country like Norway because a small population is scattered over a large geographical area 
which often makes air transport the only option. Both SAS and Norwegian are important 
participants in making this happen, but especially SAS as they also operate on the short haul 
network between smaller cities. This is the main reason for the Department’s wish to secure 
lasting ownership in SAS (Pollestad 2009). 
 
The Industrial comity is made up of members from all political parties. In April 2007 the 
comity looked through its position on active and long term ownership of SAS. From this it is 
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clear that the representatives from FrP did not see any reasons for the Norwegian government 
to be owner in a commercial airline. They therefore suggested that the ―house of 
representatives‖ gave the Government authorisation to sell the SAS shares. FrP proposed this 
because of all the turmoil in the company over the last years. Intense competition both 
nationally and internationally was also put forward as a reason because they did no-longer see 
the need of a government controlled airline (Nilsen 2009).  
 
Of importance is also the fact that the government’s involvement in SAS’ rights issue will 
have an effect on the terms of free competition. Because of today’s situation in the financial 
sector it is difficult to raise new capital and this creates great challenges for a lot of 
companies. The representative for FrP points out that when Norwegian Air Shuttle has to go 
out of the country to find capital to buy new airplanes, the government’s involvement in the 
competitor is clearly not good. This especially since SAS’ CEO Mads Jansson cannot 
guarantee that the rights issue will save the company. 
 
The Norwegian government’s most important priority in the aviation market is to maintain 
competition, largest possible route network and low prices. Both parties of ―Høyre‖ and 
―Venstre‖ still mean that keeping today’s level of ownership is dependent on whether 
Denmark and Sweden keeps their level of ownership (Nilsen 2009). In proposition number 
161 to ―the house of representatives‖ , ―Høyre‖ underlines that a sale of SAS can only be 
done at a time when the sale means that the government’s financial value, Norwegian aviation 
and the company’s interests is kept in a good manner.  
 
The majority of the Standing Committee of Business and Industry place emphasis on other 
reasons than just commercial in the question tied to participation in the rights issue. The 
committee emphasizes that SAS has been, and probably will be, one of the major socio-
economic income sources in the Norwegian infrastructure with their network and service 
industry. In addition consideration for employees is of importance. 
 
From an overall evaluation it seems like the politicians dispute whether economic or non-
economic goals are most important. SAS has consistently delivered negative returns which is 
weakening the government’s popularity for retaining the government controlled shares.  
80 
 
9.4 Sources of error  
 
As mentioned earlier a valuation is more an art then an exact science. So the sources of errors 
could be countless and the results we present are not the one correct answer.  
 
A valuation is said to be no better than the quality of the inputs used. We have mostly used 
financial data from SAS’ annual reports which are produced by the company itself. Any errors 
in these or untruthful reporting will influence the validity of our results. But the accounts 
found in the annual reports have been audited by a state approved auditor. It is also worth 
mentioning that SAS’ annual reports are considered to be of high standard as they have done 
considerably well in e.com’s worldwide annual report ranking. The report for 2007 was 
number six on the world ranking (SAS Group Annual Report 2009).  
 
SAS is going through a major restructuring process with the sale of Spanair and the 
introduction of a major cost saving program. In our forecast we have assumed that this 
process will be successful. There is no guarantee for this, but the most important assumption 
for using the discounted cash flow valuation method is continuing operations. And without a 
successful turnaround the company will probably go bankrupt or be sold for nearly nothing 
(like when SAS sold Span Air for one euro). 
 
We also feel that the leasing issue is a bit hairy. We have tried to find some information on 
how the 7x leasing capitalization is calculated but have not succeeded. Therefore we just had 
to put trust in these assumptions. As we looked at other airline companies we discovered that 
for example Iberia uses an 8x multiple, and why should their leased planes be worth more? 
With this approximation we get a relatively higher implicit rental cost on leasing. We know 
unfortunately too little about the rent premiums involved in leasing, but at first sight the rental 
cost might seem a bit high. 
 
Pilots and other aircrew have a relatively early retiring age compared to other industries. This, 
coupled with lucrative union agreements, has resulted in huge future pension obligations. 
Despite of this the balance sheet shows that the company has a net pension asset and not a 
liability. They have also calculated that the difference between the net present value of founds 
and expenses is nearly nothing. The NPV of pension obligations are however calculated with 
a set of assumptions that include such factors as inflation, general wage growth and real return 
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on the pension fund. We have chosen not to go to deeply into this but there have been 
criticism from financial experts that the assumptions used in the pension calculations are to 
favorable for the company and that there might be a huge hidden pension liability.   
 
The sensitive analysis shows how sensitive the share price is with regards to the most 
important values. As we saw the share price changes dramatically with only small changes in 
the inputs. Especially the WACC and growth factor are values that are hard to predict. When 
this was written we were in the middle of a recession which has influenced the beta and risk 
free rates used in the WACC calculation. If the calculations were done on an economical peak 
the results may have been different. This might be the case of the growth factor as well which 
might have been unconscious set to low with today’s outlook for macro economic growth. For 
the WACC calculation we also used Swedish numbers as this is where the stock is main 
listed. This could be questionable since the company have major operations in both Norway 
and Denmark and are listed in these countries as well.  
 
 
9.5 Conclusion  
 
SAS’ historical performance over the last eight years has been unsatisfactory. Only three of 
eight years from 2001-2008 had a positive net result and the operating margins have been 
below what is necessarily for a sustainable profitable business. We also showed that this is not 
restricted to SAS, but is in general an industry problem. Profitability is strongly dependent on 
business cycles which make planning ahead difficult. Competition has also perhaps been too 
intense. SAS is heavily leveraged with an adjusted net debt ratio of 259 % which increase 
business risk and interest expenditures. 
 
The strategic analysis showed that SAS’ most important resource is their employees. 
Countless union conflicts have made this resource more of a liability then an asset in recent 
years. It has damaged both the company’s profitability and its public reputation. SAS has 
however a strong brand, is among the most punctual airlines in Europe and is still the number 
one choice for most business travelers. Intense competition in the industry transfer a good 
deal of market power to the costumers which makes it crucial important to satisfy customer 
demands and cope with a fast changing environment.  
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We have estimated an average cost of capital to be 8.46 %. Applied on the predicted free cash 
flows it gives us an estimated enterprise value of BSEK 37.7 and a share price of SEK 5.67. 
This is about the same value we found with a forward looking EV/EBITDAR multiple 
analysis where we found a share value SEK 5.70. These values are highly sensitive to the 
most important value drivers which are passenger revenue, payroll expenses, jet fuel and cost 
of capital.  
 
The Norwegian Government paid SEK 2.63 per new share in connection to the rights issue. 
This is significantly below the value of SEK 5.67 per share we have estimated. At the same 
time our analysis shows that SAS was in great financial trouble before the rights issue and it 
would be an unfortunate time to sell such a huge amount of rights when the equity is valued at 
an historical low level. We have also slightly mentioned that there is more value to a 
government influenced airline than the market cap of the company. Our conclusion is that the 
Norwegian government showed good ownership governance and that it was a wise decision to 
take part in the 2009 rights issue. 
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Finnair 2008 
EBITDAR 140,7 
Net debt -90 
Leasing debt (7x) 578,2 
Adjusted net debt 488,2 
Stock quote  4,35 
Number of shares 128,14 
Equity value 557 
EV 1046 
EV/EBITDAR 7,43 
Appendix figure 9: Multiple calculation for Finnair 
 
Iberia 2008 
EBITDAR 559 
Net debt -1803 
Leasing debt (7x) 2702 
Adjusted net debt 899 
Stock quote  1,74 
Number of shares(M) 953 
Equity value(M) 1658 
EV 2557 
EV/EBITDAR 4,57 
Appendix figure 10: Multiple calculation for Iberia 
 
Austrian airlines 2008 
EBITDAR 256,8 
Net debt 933,6 
Leasing debt (7x) 472,5 
Adjusted net debt 1406,1 
Stock quote  4 
Number of shares(M) 1325 
Equity value(M) 331 
EV 1737 
EV/EBITDAR 6,77 
Appendix figure 11: Multiple calculation for Austrian Airlines 
  2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 Average 
Accounts receivable 1851 1951 3918 4568 4574 4168 5147 3727 3738 
Cash and bank balances 1911 1583 1686 1419 1246 1066 1049 1280 1405 
Short term investments 3872 7308 9117 7265 7349 8000 9672 10382 7871 
                    
Short term loans 1189 421 2043 3828 5479 5981 7552 4603 3887 
Accounts payable 2068 2108 3350 4358 4251 3462 4259 2621 3310 
                    
Working capital 4377 8313 9328 5066 3439 3791 4057 8165 5817 
Revenue 53 195 50 598 50 153 55 501 58 093 57 754 64 945 51 435 55209,25 
% of revenue  8,2 % 16,4 % 18,6 % 9,1 % 5,9 % 6,6 % 6,2 % 15,9 % 10,9 % 
Appendix figure 12: Net working capital 
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Appendix figure 13: Historical depreciation 
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